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Foreword 
 
“Credibility begins at home.” Gijs de Vries in the present study 
 
Illiberal tendencies are putting pressure on the European political project committed to 
the rule of law, multilateralism and liberal-democratic values – not only from the outside, 
but also from within. To defend its values, Europe needs to know exactly where its credi-
bility is called into question. From a European point of view, international cultural rela-
tions and cultural diplomacy promote cultural freedom and offer the possibility to sup-
port cultural agents whose space for expression is shrinking. How should the European 
strategy for culture in external relations be shaped to contribute to this aim? Which policy 
fields could be fostered through the inclusion of culture to make use of its transversal 
role?      
 
The author of this study describes changes in the international world order, upcoming 
challenges for Europe and possible actions for European policy makers to counter the 
developments mentioned above and defend liberal democratic values. This study forms 
part of ifa’s Research Programme “Culture and Foreign Policy”, in which experts address 
relevant issues relating to culture and foreign policy with the aim of involving academics, 
practitioners, policymakers and civil society. The underlying research project was con-
ducted within the Federal Foreign Office’s framework for developing a new concept for 
future German cultural and educational policies.   
 
I would like to thank Gijs de Vries for his excellent work and commitment to this re-
search project. In addition, I would like to thank my ifa colleagues Odila Triebel, Sarah 
Widmaier and Anja Schön for their work on the coordination and editing of this project.  
 
ifa is committed to peaceful and enriching coexistence between people and cultures 
worldwide. We promote art and cultural exchange through exhibitions, dialogue and 
conference programmes. As a competence centre for international cultural relations, ifa 
connects civil societies, cultural practices, art, media and science. In times of shrinking free 
spaces in many societies, national cultural institutes, EUNIC and the European External 
Action Service need to join their forces in international cultural relations within the EU 
and in cooperation with third countries. We have to understand the mechanisms behind 
this trend and develop possible strategies to preserve spaces for critical reflection, dia-
logue and international cooperation. 
 
Ronald Grätz,  
Secretary General, ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)
Abstract 
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Abstract 
In 2017 EU ministers said that culture is “an essential part of the EU’s international rela-
tions.” But the EU is a new-comer to the field of cultural diplomacy and its policy is still in 
its infancy, both conceptually and in terms of implementation. Many questions remain 
unanswered. How to draw the line between cultural relations and public diplomacy on 
the one hand and propaganda on the other? How to steer clear of neo-colonialism? How 
to encourage European governments, who are prone to national cultural show-casing, to 
work together and derive strength from unity? This paper will explore some of the con-
tours of this emerging European Union policy, its potential as well as its limitations.   
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Executive summary 
The liberal international order is undergoing rapid change. Power is shifting from west-
ern states to rising powers, liberal-democratic values are under attack in many parts of the 
world, and America appears to be losing interest in upholding the liberal international 
order. Russia and China restrict and distort free speech, and the European Union finds 
itself increasingly challenged in the realm of ideas.  
 
Faced with threats to its cultural identity, Europe needs to mount a cultural response. 
EU member states have long practiced cultural diplomacy, and EU ministers have stated 
that culture must also be an integral part of the EU’s international relations. This paper 
explores the contours of the emerging European strategy of cultural diplomacy.  
 
Europe’s position is stronger than might appear at first sight. European public opinion 
did not react to the divisions and uncertainties of recent times by turning against the 
European Union, nor has the EU been paralysed. Worldwide, the EU’s image remains 
broadly positive. However, Europe will have to take more responsibility for its own secu-
rity. China’s political use of cultural relations needs a political riposte.  
 
Democracy is central to Europe’s identity. For decades, democracy spread across the 
world, but in recent years the tide has turned. Democratic values have suffered as media 
freedom, independent institutions, and the rule of law are being curtailed. Authoritarian 
governments have learned to ‘game the system’ and erode democracy by stealth. The 
authoritarian attacks on democracy must be met with hard as well as soft power, includ-
ing a vigorous defence of free speech and other human rights. 
 
To push back against oppression EU governments should step up support for the 
main international human rights regimes, including that of the Council of Europe. Euro-
pean diplomats should speak out more often and openly in support of artists, journalists, 
and other victims of censorship. The EU should also raise its voice in defence of academic 
freedom, as a dimension of the wider right of everyone to take part in cultural life.  
 
Disinformation has an increasingly corrosive effect on trust in democratic societies. 
Disinformation is practiced systematically by Russia, which uses it to disrupt liberal de-
mocracies. Europe bears the brunt of Russian information operations, which some assess 
as notably successful.  
 
Executive summary 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Cultural Freedom in European Foreign Policy          7 
Today’s leading digital communication companies exercise extraordinary cultural 
power. The EU’s approach to oblige social media companies to act as gate-keepers of 
information poses risks to freedom of expression. Legislation may be required to secure 
transparency and accountability. Independent, quality journalism needs more support, 
including from the EU.  
 
The cultural and creative industries are among the fastest growing sectors in the 
world, often providing an income to the poorest and most vulnerable. The Sustainable 
Development Goals imply that culture must be an integral part of policies to alleviate 
poverty, promote education, gender equality, and sustainable urbanisation, and build 
peaceful societies that respect universal human rights. This is the most comprehensive 
agenda for culture the world has ever seen. The EU should publish a white paper propos-
ing to work with international partners in leading this agenda. European priorities should 
include culture and education, culture and governance, and culture and security.  
 
Along with changes in the world at large there have been important developments 
closer to home, within the European Union. One prominent development has been the 
rise of intolerance fuelled by populism. There is no democracy without liberty, and “illib-
eral democracy” poses an existential threat to European values and institutions. Popular 
discontent is fuelled by a pervasive sense of economic injustice and political disenfran-
chisement, which EU governments have yet to address. Cultural causes of discontent are 
among the most complex. As part of its response the EU should strengthen its policies and 
budgets for citizenship, education, and culture.   
 
Europeans regard culture as the factor that does most to create a feeling of community 
among them as EU citizens. Cultural heritage, citizenship education, and language educa-
tion could be among the building blocks of national and European policies to strengthen 
the saliency of European citizenship, along with steps to restore the humanities at the 
centre of public education. The EU would have to secure sufficient financing in its new 
multi-annual financial framework.  
 
The attacks on Europe’s core values of liberty, democracy, and the rule of law leave no 
room for complacency. Europe does not lack the means to respond; what it lacks is a sense 
of direction. Cultural diplomacy must be at the centre of Europe’s response to the erosion 
of liberty around the world. Cultural diplomacy’s traditional model, with its dominant 
emphasis on displaying national cultural “achievements”, is no longer fit for purpose. It 
must be replaced by a model that not only combines national perspectives with a com-
Executive summary 
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mon, European approach, but which also has cultural freedom among its prime objec-
tives. At the same time, national cultural institutes should do more to integrate the Euro-
pean dimension into their operations. Europe can no longer afford business as usual.  
 
Cultural diplomacy is not a panacea. In and by itself culture cannot resolve either in-
tra-national conflicts or international ones. But culture can facilitate independent thinking, 
dialogue, and understanding, provided it is employed freely and independently by artists. 
The EU’s current policies contain some welcome innovations but the EU is still a long way 
from realising the potential of cultural diplomacy. The EU should upgrade its policies for 
international cultural relations and integrate them with its other policies to defend and 
promote the rights and liberties that are at the core of Europe’s identity, at home and 
abroad.  
1. Introduction 
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1. Introduction 
States practice foreign policy to defend and promote their interests in the world. States 
tend to define their national interests primarily in terms of security and prosperity, but 
these interests are also frequently taken to include key national values and traditions. In 
Europe the constitutional order includes democracy, the rule of law, and respect for  
human rights. These values are central to Europe’s identity and to European foreign  
policy. 
 
These European core values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are  
increasingly being challenged around the world. China and Russia assertively promote a 
fundamentally different model, and their views find a ready audience among authoritari-
an rulers everywhere. Across the globe, freedom of expression and other fundamental 
rights are under attack. Meanwhile, populists and nationalists are working hard to weak-
en the European constitutional order from the inside. Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and 
other forms of intolerance are on the rise. At home as well as abroad, Europe is embroiled 
in a contest of values and ideas.  
 
How can liberal democracies respond? What combination of hard and soft power do 
they need to preserve the rights and liberties that are fundamental to Europe’s cultural 
identity? These are the principal questions this paper seeks to address.  
 
A country’s soft power, Professor Joseph Nye has written, rests primarily on three  
resources: its culture (where others find this attractive), its political values (when it lives 
up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legiti-
mate).1 Soft power, the power of attraction, has long been part of European diplomacy. In 
Germany, cultural relations and education policy form the third pillar of foreign policy, 
along with political and economic relations. France counts “a vibrant culture” among the 
factors that contribute to its security, prosperity, and influence.2 The United Kingdom, in 
the opinion of (then) Foreign Secretary William Hague, is “a modern day cultural super-
power.”3   
 
  
                                               
1 Joseph Nye, Soft Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 11. 
2 République Française, Defence and National Security Strategic Review (Paris, 2017), p. 52. 
3 William Hague, Foreword, in John Holden, Influence and Attraction (London: British Council, 2013). 
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The European Union, too, is engaged in cultural diplomacy. In 2017 EU ministers said 
that culture is “an essential part of the EU’s international relations.”4 But the EU is a new-
comer to the field and its policy is still in its infancy, both conceptually and in terms of 
implementation. Many questions remain unanswered. How to draw the line between 
cultural relations and public diplomacy on the one hand and propaganda on the other? 
How to steer clear of neo-colonialism? How to encourage European governments, who 
are prone to national cultural show-casing, to work together and derive strength from 
unity? This paper will explore some of the contours of this emerging European Union 
policy and assess its potential as well as its limitations in safeguarding Europe’s values 
and interests.  
 
The EU enjoys a broadly positive reputation around the world. If Europeans act with 
tact, openness to partners, and a sense of common purpose, they are well-placed to win 
friends and work with them to mutual advantage. The Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable 
Development Goals represent opportunities for European diplomacy, including in the 
cultural domain. But the going will not be easy.  
 
If Europe is to defend its values effectively abroad, then Europeans will have to stand 
up for them at home, with courage and conviction. Soft power, as Nye points out, in-
volves more than cultural relations alone: it demands consistency between foreign and 
domestic policy. Cultural diplomats and practitioners must face inwards as well as out-
wards. This means that they not only have physical borders to cross, but mental and bu-
reaucratic boundaries as well – and these may well be the greater obstacles.  
 
The attacks on Europe’s core values of liberty, democracy, and the rule of law are 
dangerous; they leave no room for complacency. But the rise of illiberalism should not be 
cause for despondency either. Europe does not lack the means to respond; what it lacks is 
a sense of direction. Too often, as the composer Chilly Gonzales put it, it looks like “a 
movie with no plot”. Faced with threats to its cultural identity, Europe needs to mount a 
cultural response.  
 
The main argument of this paper is that cultural diplomacy can be a key component of 
this response, provided it is rethought and redesigned. Cultural diplomacy needs a para-
digm shift, both at national and at European level. The traditional model, with its domi-
nant emphasis on displaying national cultural “achievements”, is no longer fit for pur-
                                               
4 Council conclusions on culture in the European Union’s external relations, Brussels, 23 May 2017. 
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pose. It must be replaced by a model that not only combines national perspectives with a 
common, European approach, but which also has cultural freedom among its prime objec-
tives. If Europeans are to respond effectively to the erosion of liberty around the world, 
they will have to employ all the means at their disposal. For the EU this means that  
cultural diplomacy must be reconfigured as an integral dimension of European foreign 
policy instead of being treated as an incidental adjunct, as is the case today. The EU needs 
to move beyond the confines of its current policy framework, recognising both the limits 
and the potential of a more ambitious approach.  
 
Some of the concepts used in this paper, such as soft power, public diplomacy, cultur-
al diplomacy and international cultural relations, have been extensively discussed in the 
academic literature. They are considered parts of a semantic field but there is no consen-
sus as to their exact definition.5 Many practitioners use terms such as cultural diplomacy 
and international cultural relations interchangeably.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, power in international relations will be regarded as the 
capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect 
the behaviour of other states.6 Soft power, as defined by Nye, is the ability to affect others 
to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion, 
and positive attraction.7 Cultural diplomacy is regarded as a subset of public diplomacy, 
which is understood by practitioners as activities undertaken to understand, inform and 
engage individuals and organisations in other countries in order to shape their percep-
tions in ways that will promote a country and its policy goals internationally.8 Culture in 
these pages is used in a triple sense: a people’s way of life (customs, values, ideals), arts 
and heritage, and popular culture (the products of a commercial entertainment industry).9 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the main changes in the interna-
tional order that present risks and opportunities to European liberal democracies. The 
argument then explores some of these changes in greater detail. Starting with the risks, 
                                               
5 Marie Gillespie et al., The Cultural Value Project: Cultural Relations in ‘Societies in Transition’ (Hertie 
School of Governance and The Open University, 2018), p. 20. 
6 John Stoessinger, ‘The Anatomy of the Nation-State and the Nature of Power’, in Michael Smith,  
Richard Little, and Michael Shackleton (eds.) Perspectives on World Politics, (London: Croom Helm, 
1981), p. 36. 
7 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Hard, Soft, and Smart Power’, in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, Ramesh Thakur,  
The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 565. 
8 Australia’s public diplomacy: building our image. Report by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade (Canberra: Senate of Australia, 2007), p. 12. 
9 For a similar definition, see Martha Bayles, Through a Screen Darkly. Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, 
and America’s Image Abroad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 5. 
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section 3 sets out the dangers posed by the hollowing out of democracy, while sections 4 
and 5 discuss the growing contestation of human rights, and the disruptive use of disin-
formation (digital disorder). The paper next explores some of the opportunities which the 
new global development agenda provides.  
 
In section 7 the paper turns from global trends to the rise of populism within Europe 
itself; section 8 discusses what it will take to turn the tide, including a re-evaluation of 
European citizenship.  
 
The consequences and lessons for cultural policies and practices will be discussed 
throughout the text; the final section presents proposals and conclusions. Throughout the 
analysis the focus will be on the role of the European Union and its efforts to develop an 
EU strategy for international cultural relations. Given its brevity, this paper does not 
pretend to be exhaustive. Its primary goal is to contribute to further discussion and analy-
sis. The views expressed are those of the author. 
2. A changing world order 
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2. A changing world order 
What is the liberal international order? One leading analyst, John Ikenberry, defines it as 
an “open and rule-based international order” that is “enshrined in institutions such as the 
United Nations and norms such as multilateralism.”10 At its heart were collective security, 
open markets, and democracy.11 This order is changing rapidly, and may even be fractur-
ing. Change is affecting it at three levels: i) power is shifting from western states to rising 
powers, ii) liberal-democratic values are being challenged in many parts of the world, and 
iii) the US appears to be losing interest in upholding the liberal international order.  
 
The post-1945 dominance of western powers is under pressure from various quarters. 
Daalder and Lindsay distinguish between three categories of challengers: i) revisionist   
powers, such as China and Russia, who want to reshape global rules to their own ad-
vantage; ii) emerging powers, such as Brazil and India, who embrace the perks of great-
power status but shun the responsibilities that come with it; and iii) rejectionist powers, 
such as Iran and North Korea, that defy rules set by others.12 
 
In 2014 Russia illegally annexed Crimea and the city of Sevastopol – the first time 
since the Second World War that military force was used to change European borders. In 
2016 Russia attempted to trigger a coup in Montenegro. Moscow has also supported de-
stabilising activities of political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, encouraged anti-EU 
sentiment in Europe, interfered in American and French elections, and engaged in cyber-
attacks and attempted attacks, including on the headquarters of the OPCW in The Hague. 
The UK now regards Russia as a bigger threat to its national security than Islamic State 
and Al Qaeda.13 
 
China, too, has used military force in defiance of international law. It has rapidly built 
up its military presence on islands in the South China Sea. When its territorial claims were 
rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, China dismissed the ruling as “a piece of 
paper” that is destined to come to naught.14 It has embarked on an ambitious programme 
to project its power in the world through loans (Belt and Road), investment in strategic 
                                               
10 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Future of the Liberal World Order’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, p. 56. 
11 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, ‘America’s Allies Must Step Up as America Steps Down’,  
Foreign Affairs, September 30, 2018. 
12 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, ‘America’s Allies Must Step Up as America Steps Down’,  
Foreign Affairs, September 30, 2018. 
13 British Army Chief: Russia ‘far bigger’ threat than IS, The Guardian, 24.11 2018. 
14 Tom Phillips, ‘China attacks international court after South China Sea ruling’, The Guardian,  
13 July 2016. 
2. A changing world order 
14                                ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Cultural Freedom in European Foreign Policy 
industries, diplomacy, and military means. In Asia, China spends more on defence than 
India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Pakistan, Vietnam, and the Philippines together.15 
 
Both China and Russia actively seek to change the international discourse about hu-
man rights, including in the UN Human Rights Committee. To promote their state-centric 
agenda both Moscow and Beijing have significantly upgraded their cultural diplomacy 
and informational activities in other countries.  
 
The third major development is America’s change of direction. Its largely unsuccessful 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have dented America’s readiness to deploy force as 
an instrument of statecraft. America’s willingness to act as guardian of the international 
trading regime has also waned, even among Democrats: as Presidential candidate, Hillary 
Clinton withdrew her support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. But prior to Donald 
Trump’s election, leading Democrats and Republicans remained by and large committed 
to America’s post-1945 role as leader of the “free world.”  
 
Trump broke with this tradition. As President, Trump has described NATO as  
“obsolete” (a remark he retracted), and the EU as a “foe” (a remark that still stands). He 
has praised dictators and scorned allies, including Canada, Germany and the UK. Trump 
imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium from Canada and Europe, ostensibly for reasons 
of security. He ended America’s participation in the 2015 Paris Agreement to mitigate 
climate change. He took the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and compelled 
Mexico and Canada to change the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
President Trump abrogated the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran and has recently an-
nounced to withdraw from the INF nuclear arms control agreement with Russia. Wash-
ington has cut off funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
which provides humanitarian aid to Palestinians. The US has left UNESCO. It has stopped 
cooperating with UN Special Rapporteurs whose global mandate includes possible hu-
man rights infringements in the USA.  
 
At the 2018 G-7 summit world leaders argued over whether an order based on princi-
ples and common values was still applicable for the seven most powerful countries in the 
Western world. This is how the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, de-
scribed the outcome:  
 
                                               
15 Jamie Smyth, ‘Battle stations: Asia’s arms race hots up’, Financial Times, 26 August 2018. 
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“And probably for the first time in our modern history, the President of the United 
States said he was not interested in continuing such thinking or such action. And he de-
leted, virtually with his own hand, the sentence, which has always appeared in the dec-
larations of the seven most powerful countries in the Western world to the effect that 
we seek to safeguard a world order based on principles and values.”16 
 
For 70 years, principles and values helped hold the Atlantic Alliance, the World Trade 
Organisation, and other pillars of the international order together. This era, it seems, is 
now closing. With Russia stirring up trouble, China rising, and America unpredictable 
and possibly unreliable as a guarantor of the liberal world order, how should Europeans 
respond?  
 
Where does Europe stand? 
Two world wars and decolonisation put an end to Europe’s position as the geopolitical 
centre of the world. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
Europe also lost its place at the centre of US foreign policy. “A century ago, Europe was 
the centre of the world – even if it was the dark centre of the world,” Dominique Moïsi 
observed. “Today we might be back to tragedy but not centrality.”17  
 
This process is set to continue. As other global and regional power centres emerge, 
Europe’s relative position will inevitably erode. For a start, Europe’s share of the world 
population will decline. In 2015 the EU counted 509 million inhabitants, some 6.9% of the 
world’s total. China (1.4 billion) and India (1.3 billion) together accounted for 35% of the 
global population. As other parts of the world grow, China’s share is projected to fall from 
18.9% to 12.0% in 2050, while India’s share is expected to fall from 17.7% to 16.1%. The 
EU’s share of the world’s population is projected to shrink to a mere 5% by 2065.18  
 
In economic terms, too, Europe’s relative power will continue to decline, although less 
sharply. The EU is currently the world’s third major economic power, behind China and 
the USA. China and India are catching up, and are projected to overtake both the EU and 
the USA. Between 2016 and 2050 China’s share of world GDP (in PPP) is expected to rise 
from 18% to 20%; India’s share will grow from 7% to 15%; the US share will fall from 16% 
                                               
16 Donald Tusk, ‘November 11, 2018: Poland and Europe. Two Anniversaries, Two Lessons’, 2018. 
17 Quoted in Katrin Bennhold, ‘Can Europe’s Liberal Order Survive as the Memory of War Fades?,  
New York Times, November 10, 2018. 
18 Eurostat, The EU in the world – 2018 edition (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2018), pp. 16-17. 
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to 12%; and the EU’s share will fall from 15% to 9%.19 Even as it slides from third place to 
fourth the EU will remain a prominent economic force in the world. 
 
In terms of military power the USA is likely to retain its dominant position for many 
years to come. True, China and India are engaged in a massive military build-up. In 2017 
China increased its military spending by 5.6% and India by 5.5%, while Russia’s spending 
fell by 20%. China is building the equivalent of almost the entire British Royal Navy every 
year.20 But the United States continues to lead the world. At 610 billion USD, US military 
spending accounted for more than a third of the world’s total in 2017. The USA’s spend-
ing was 2.7% greater than the next spender, China; indeed, the USA spent more than the 
next seven highest spenders combined. The European countries are minor players. France 
spent 57.8 billion USD (3.3% world share; 2.3% GDP); the UK spent 47.2 billion USD (2.7% 
world total; 1.8% GDP), and Germany spent 44.3 billion USD (2.5% world share; 1.2% 
GDP).21 America’s military supremacy is likely to continue for the foreseeable future: in 
2018 US military spending rose sharply to 700 billion USD.  
 
The combination of economic strength, military weakness, and demographic decline 
leaves the countries of Europe with a brittle power base. Political developments over the 
past decade and a half have been hardly less challenging. The global financial crisis 
showed that Europeans lack the tools and the cohesion to manage their global financial 
interests. The subsequent Euro-crisis fuelled deep misgivings and distrust between 
Northern and Southern Europeans. In 2015 tensions between Western and Central  
Europeans, and within many Western countries, were aggravated by Angela Merkel’s 
unilateral decision to open Germany’s borders to asylum seekers and other migrants. The 
British decision, in 2016, to leave the European Union dealt another blow. Unsurprisingly, 
many opinion-leaders are pessimistic about the future. Some believe that the European 
Union is doomed.22 A Bundeswehr planning scenario leaked in 2017 imagined the EU’s 
eastern states splitting off and joining an autocratic, Eurasian bloc by 2040.23 
 
British analysts in particular have long argued that the EU is, or has become, too di-
verse, or too meddlesome, to hold together. It is bound to disintegrate sooner or later and 
suffer the fate of previous common European ventures. According to the influential col-
                                               
19 PwC, The Long View - How will the global economic order change by 2050? (PwC, 2017). 
20 Financial Times, ‘The military aims of ‘Global Britain’ must be realistic’, 4 January 2019. 
21 SIPRI, Trends in world military expenditure, 2017 (SIPRI Fact Sheet, May 2018). 
22 Jan Zielonka, Is the EU Doomed? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). 
23 The Economist, ‘In bad Oder. Germany’s troubled relations with the Visegrad states show the limits to 
its power’, 16 June 2018, p. 24. 
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umnist Simon Jenkins, the EU “has clearly become too insensitive, too brittle, to survive 
for ever. All Europe’s great settlements – Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, Versailles, Yalta – 
have lasted no more than two generations.”24 Echoing Zielonka’s vision of the European 
Union as a neo-medieval empire, Jenkins sees the EU degenerating into a new Holy Ro-
man Empire: a graduated, multi-layered, essentially German confederation of states. 
Meanwhile populists from left and right decry the European Union as a German-
dominated super-state which tramples the sovereignty and identity of its component 
peoples.  
 
But there is another side to this coin. Europe is stronger than it might at first sight  
appear. Contrary to expectations, European public opinion did not react to the difficulties, 
divisions, and uncertainties of recent times by turning against the European Union. On 
the contrary, it appears that Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have galvanised 
public support for the European Union. In 2018 favourability ratings of the EU reached 
their highest level in 35 years.25 Close to three-quarters of respondents in the Euro area are 
in favour of the Euro (74%), while 20% are against. Perhaps equally remarkably, overall 
trust in the European Union remains higher than trust in national governments and na-
tional parliaments.26  
 
Nor has the EU been paralysed. No country has left the Euro; in fact, six new countries 
joined since the outbreak of the financial crisis.27 The EU has redoubled its efforts to 
strengthen the global trading system, striking deals with Canada and Japan. The trade 
agreement with Japan is the largest in the EU’s history and covers nearly a third of the 
world’s GDP. For the first time the EU’s draft multiannual financial framework includes a 
significant budget for European defence cooperation. In response to China’s targeting of 
foreign technology an EU framework for screening foreign direct investment was agreed 
in record time. As an inadvertent by-product of its large internal market the EU continues 
to wield significant global regulatory power.28 Its privacy standards, for example, lead the 
world.  
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The EU may not be a “soft superpower”, but it is held in favourable opinion in many 
parts of the world. A 2017 BBC-commissioned survey of opinions in 18 countries around 
the world showed that, on average, the EU was viewed more positively than China, the 
United States, and Russia.29 In 2018, another poll confirmed this result for the countries of 
North Africa and the Middle East, where the EU is viewed favourably by majorities in 
eight of the ten countries surveyed (all except Egypt and Iraq). China was held in favour-
able opinion in six countries. Majorities in four countries hold positive views of Russia; 
the USA receives favourable ratings by majorities only in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.30  
 
Such statistics should be read with a degree of caution: favourability ratings do not 
readily translate into political influence. Still, the EU’s broadly positive image does consti-
tute an asset in an era of increasing global political competition. It remains for the EU – EU 
governments as well as EU institutions – to recognise the value of this asset, and to build 
on it.   
 
For all its evident flaws the European Union remains a beacon of hope to countless 
people, within Europe itself and elsewhere in the world. Hopes and expectations can be 
particularly strong in regions where people’s liberties are ignored and their rights denied. 
It often takes writers and artists, working outside official channels, to register such hopes 
– the hope that Europe will live up to its values of freedom and justice, and that Europe-
ans will not abandon them to their fate.  
 
Navid Kermani is the author of several books and essays on Islam, the Middle East, 
and Christian-Muslim relations. His most recent book is the reflection of his travels from 
Europe’s borders to Isfahan.31 Again and again, Kermani meets people who hope that 
Europe will support their yearning to be free. Will Europe pay attention to their voices, 
and those of other neighbours, far and wide? Will politicians and intellectuals listen to the 
messages from outside their borders?  
 
The international order is in flux. Europe may no longer be its geopolitical zenith, but 
neither is it the nadir. The European Union is not an international power in the traditional, 
Westphalian sense, nor is it likely to become one, occasional rhetoric about a “European 
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army” notwithstanding. But the EU is more resilient, and more relevant, than its doom-
sayers allow for.  
 
The international order is changing fast. Some of the changes are political and eco-
nomic; others are cultural. The political and economic challenges are well-known. Now 
that America is increasingly focused on Asia, Europe will need to take more responsibility 
for its own security. European governments will also have to work more closely together 
to weather the growing global competition in trade and investments. The third area where 
European interests and values are being challenged is the realm of ideas. Russia and Chi-
na are harnessing information and disinformation as instruments of foreign policy. Both 
Moscow and Beijing work hard to divide the European Union, and their strategy is not 
without success. But where Russia appears to concentrate on disruption, China poses a 
perhaps more fundamental, long-term challenge in terms of values and ideas. China 
makes more systematic use of “soft power”, and Europe is still far from formulating an 
effective response.  
 
China’s “soft power” 
China’s ambition to become a global power is reflected principally in its military build-up, 
the Belt and Road Initiative, and its soft power strategy. The military build-up has already 
been discussed; we now briefly look at the other two initiatives.  
 
The Belt and Road Initiative is huge, although its exact costs are unknown; most ex-
perts think it dwarfs the American Marshall Programme from the 1950s in real terms. 
”Belt and Road” serves to link other countries to China through maritime, terrestrial, and 
digital infrastructure. Cybersecurity and -surveillance is one of the priorities. Chinese 
cyber- surveillance systems have found customers in Ethiopia, Ecuador, South Africa, 
Bolivia, Egypt, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia .32 Along with its technology China exports its 
restrictive cybersecurity legislation to countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, and Vietnam. 
China is also investing heavily in foreign telecommunications infrastructure and has 
donated computers to governments in nearly three dozen countries, from Pakistan to 
Malawi.  
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Sometimes its gifts come with hidden strings attached. In 2012 the African Union was 
the grateful recipient of a new headquarters, which China had built and donated. It took 
the African Union five years to discover that the Chinese-installed computer system had 
been equipped with a back door through which its servers were emptied every night, the 
contents transferred to Shanghai.33  
 
China also strives to extend its soft power. At the Communist Party’s 2007 Congress, 
Chinese President Hu Jintao called for China to “increase the country’s cultural soft pow-
er”. His successor, current President Xi Jinping, echoed Hu’s message in 2014: “We should 
increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate Chi-
na’s message to the world.” 
 
China’s soft power strategy ranges from “panda diplomacy” and the promotion of the 
Chinese New Year (2,000 activities in 140 countries) to the blocking of Facebook, Google, 
Instagram, and Twitter. Its instruments include the Xinhua news agency; the China Global 
Television Network (which broadcasts in Arabic, English, French, Russian, and Spanish); 
China Radio International (which broadcasts in 60 languages); China Daily; some 500 
Confucius Institutes in around 140 countries; educational exchanges; foreign policy think 
tanks; “host diplomacy” (conferences in China); and programmes on sports and culture. 
China is currently streamlining its soft power infrastructure. It is merging its state broad-
casters into a single entity, Voice of China, to rival the US-funded Voice of America. It is 
also merging its media regulator (State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film 
and Television) with the Ministry of Culture. China’s annual budget for “external propa-
ganda” has been estimated at 10 billion USD.34 It is a massive programme by any stand-
ards. 
 
Is it successful? How much value for money China’s soft power strategy generates is 
difficult to say. The Portland 30 Index combines six sub-indices into a composite soft 
power score (culture, digital, education, engagement, enterprise, government). Its 2018 
edition puts China near the bottom of its list, in 27th place, just before Russia, Brazil, and 
Argentina. Monocle’s Soft Power Survey 2018/19, another commercial initiative, ranks 
China 19th out of the 25 countries it compared.  
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Opinion polls deliver more interesting, fine-grained results. Negative and positive 
views of China appear to be fairly evenly balanced. A GlobeScan poll conducted in 2017 
showed that on average, across 17 countries, positive ratings of China were at 41% (down 
from 43% in 2014) and negative ratings were at 42% (up from 40% in 2014). However, 
views in Africa, where China is making major investments, were strongly positive (83% in 
Nigeria, 63% in Kenya).35  
 
A survey published in 2018 by the Pew Research Center showed that across the 25 
countries surveyed, a median of 45% have a favourable view of China while 43% hold an 
unfavourable view. Majorities or pluralities in 12 countries give China positive marks. 
Positive views of China are most prevalent in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. 
Negative views of China are tied to perceptions of its human rights record. There is, how-
ever, widespread agreement that China is on the rise.36  
 
China, then, may not be winning much sympathy but it seems to be gaining respect. 
How much of this is due to its hard power projection (military muscle flexing, Belt and 
Road, espionage), and how much to soft power or cultural diplomacy, is impossible to 
say.  
 
In any event, such statistics do not capture the full story. Gaining friends and admirers 
abroad is not the only aim of China’s cultural diplomacy. Two other objectives are at least 
as important: blocking foreign (and particularly “Western”) ideas from influencing Chi-
nese citizens, and eliminating foreign sources of criticism. There is a hard edge to China’s 
soft power. 
 
China runs what is arguably the world’s most pervasive censorship regime. It blocks 
foreign broadcasters, such as the Australian Broadcasting Corp, foreign social media, and 
European internet sites such as that of Deutsche Welle and the BBC. Chinese censors 
routinely block access to foreign culture deemed to contain “low-taste content”, including 
foreign cultural products such as hip hop music and karaoke. Beijing disallows the publi-
cation of any works by authors it dislikes, including Nobel Prize winner and human rights 
activist Liu Xiaobo, who died in prison in 2017. 
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At the same time, China systematically works to influence how international media 
comment on China. In a practice known as “borrow a boat to go on to the ocean” China 
has set up agreements that allow foreign newspapers, radio and TV stations to use party- 
approved content for free.37 An investigation by the Financial Times found that at least 200 
nominally independent Chinese-language publications had concluded such agreements.38 
In 2015 Reuters reported that China Radio International was covertly backing at least 33 
radio stations in 14 countries.39 In 2018 the network had extended to 58 stations in 35 
countries.40  
 
China’s interpretation of cultural diplomacy includes pressure to exercise self-
censorship. This succeeds distressingly often. In 2017 the Annecy Film festival was about 
to screen Liu Jian’s “Have a nice day”, a film which portrayed a bleak image of China, 
when the organisers withdrew the film, citing “official pressures”. Apple agreed to re-
move hundreds of apps from its App Store, including Virtual Private Networks used to 
circumvent China’s internet censors.41 Google designed a search engine, codenamed 
Dragonfly, which would have been compatible with Chinese internet censorship; it only 
agreed to drop the project after protests from staff and human rights groups.  
 
Pressure to restrict free speech and other liberties is also applied systematically to aca-
demic exchanges. Chinese universities have been instructed to “stand firm and hold the 
political, legal and moral bottom line” and exert tighter control over the use of imported 
textbooks “that spread Western values”.42 European universities that accept to host Con-
fucius Institutes, co-financed by China, are being asked to agree that they will respect 
“cultural custom” and “not contravene […] the laws and regulations” of China.43 In the 
United States, a report by the National Association of Scholars concludes that “to a large 
extent, universities have made improper concessions that jeopardise academic freedom 
and institutional autonomy. Sometimes these concessions are official and in writing; more 
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often they operate as implicit policies.”44 Stockholm University is one of several universi-
ties in Europe, Canada, and the USA that have decided to close their Confucius Institute.  
 
China’s not-so-soft approach to power begs the question how European governments 
should respond. On the one hand, options are limited. Political and economic interests 
dictate that Europe will have to work with China. But how it does so is up to Europe itself. 
The greater its unity, the greater its strength. To stop China exploiting European divisions, 
the EU should insist on reciprocity in cultural relations. China is building networks with 
think tanks in Europe, notably as part of its 16+1 network with Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, but Beijing does not give European research institutes reciprocal access to China. 
European universities need to re-assess their policy of welcoming Confucius Institutes 
where these come with political strings attached. China’s censorship of the arts, sciences, 
and journalism must be countered publicly rather than through quiet diplomacy.  
 
China’s political use of cultural relations needs a political response. That is not what 
has been happening. When EU officials exchange views with China, they talk mostly 
about trade.    
 
Having explored some of the main developments in the international order, it is time 
to take a closer look at three changes and how they affect Europe: the hollowing out of 
democracy, the growing contestation of human rights, and digital disorder.  
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3. A waning of democracy? 
Democracy is central to Europe’s identity, and EU governments have long been promot-
ing democratic reforms around the world. For decades, democracy spread across the 
world, but in recent years the tide has turned.   
 
According to the American think-tank Freedom House, in 2017 democracy faced its 
most serious crisis in decades as 71 countries suffered net declines in political rights and 
civil liberties, and only 35 registered gains. For the 12th consecutive year the Freedom 
House Index of global freedom declined. Since 2016, it reckons that 113 countries have 
shown a net decline, and only 62 showed a net improvement.45 Freedom House ranks 88 
countries (representing 39 percent of the global population) as free, 58 as partly free (24 
percent of the global population), and 49 as not free (37 percent of the global population).  
 
Other analyses confirm the downward trend. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a 
British firm, compiles an index that measures the state of democracy along five dimen-
sions: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political 
participation, and political culture. It saw 89 countries regressing in 2017, compared with 
only 27 improving. The EIU ranks 19 countries as full democracies (4.4 % of the world 
population), 57 as flawed democracies (44.3% of the global population), 39 as hybrid re-
gimes (17.7% of the global population) and 52 as authoritarian regimes (32.3% of the 
world population).46   
 
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which measures the transition of authoritari-
an states to democracy and market economies, similarly reports a decline in the ac-
ceptance of democratic institutions across the world.47 
 
For several years analysts have warned of global democratic backsliding, even in 
North America and Western Europe. Foa and Mounk (2016) found that citizens in these 
regions have become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system and 
more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. In Europe, for example, 
only 36% of millennials were found to strongly reject the notion that a government’s in-
competence can justify a military take-over.48 In one survey of 38 nations in different parts 
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of the world, a median of 49% of respondents said that rule by experts, rather than elected 
representatives, would be a good way to govern their country.49 In South Africa, 62% of 
the population say they are willing or very willing to give up elections in exchange for 
security, housing, and jobs.50 A spate of recent publications discusses the trend.51  
 
Such pessimistic assessments have not gone uncontested. First of all, international 
opinion surveys provide a mixed picture. Across Africa, popular demand for democracy 
exceeds citizens’ perception of available supply, and large majorities reject authoritarian 
alternatives such as presidential dictatorship, military rule, and one-party government.52 
Arab citizens, too, voice strong support for democracy.53 In a 38-nation poll the Pew  
Research Institute found that more than half in each of the nations polled consider repre-
sentative democracy a very or somewhat good way to govern their country. Waning 
support for democratic values is also not a consistent trend across Western countries.54 
 
Secondly, a focus on recent developments risks obscuring more positive, long term 
trends. In fact, the number of democracies in the world has grown significantly over time. 
According to one influential analysis, democratisation has progressed in waves. A first 
wave followed the widening of suffrage in the 19th century and brought the number of 
democracies in the world to some 29 by 1926. Reversals in the 1930s and 1940s reduced 
the number to 12, but following the allied victories in World War II the number of democ-
racies grew to 36 by 1962. A third global wave of democracy began with Portugal’s Carna-
tion Revolution in 1974 and swept through Latin America, parts of Asia, Eastern Europe 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and sub-Saharan Africa from 1989.55 The number of 
electoral democracies grew to well over 100. In a parallel development, ratification and 
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(partial) implementation of international human rights treaties grew significantly,  
culminating in the foundation of the International Criminal Court in 1998. So it would be 
an exaggeration to claim that democracy is dying.56 In the past half century the world has 
become notably more democratic, and considerably more free.  
 
In recent years, however, the long ”third wave” of democratisation appears to have 
crested. The change is well-documented by research at the University of Gothenburg. The 
Varieties of Democracy (“V-Dem”) project produces the largest global dataset on democ-
racy. Researchers use the data to distinguish between four regime types.57 They found 
several interesting things.  
 
First, most of the world’s countries are in the democratic spectrum (56%): 35 states 
qualify as liberal democracies and 62 as electoral democracies. Of the remaining countries 
56 (32%) are electoral autocracies and 21 (12%) are closed autocracies.58  
 
Second, the world has seen a gradual but steady increase in liberal democracy until 
around the year 2005. Since then, levels of democracy have been relatively stable across 
the world and remain close to an all-time high. However, there is a clear downward trend 
in the number of countries making democratic advancements since at least 2008, and the 
number of countries regressing towards autocracy has increased since roughly around the 
turn of the century. 59  
 
Third, the picture looks different if levels of democracy are weighted by the size of 
each country’s population. Whereas a number of smaller countries have made progress on 
democracy, such as Bhutan, Burkina Faso, and Fiji, only one major country has (Nigeria). 
Big, populous countries have shown the greatest declines in democracy, including Brazil, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the 
United States. The number of people living in non-democratic countries is growing.   
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Fourth, while multi-party elections continue to improve, they are at risk of losing their 
meaning. Media autonomy, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, 
and the rule of law have undergone the greatest declines among democracy metrics in 
recent years. This trend affects both autocracies and democracies.  
 
A final key finding concerns inclusion. Although liberal democracies are systematical-
ly better than other regimes in securing people’s democratic rights, even in democracies 
women, minorities, and the poor are systematically disadvantaged in their access to  
political power.  
 
These global trends do not tell the whole story, as they may obscure much country-
specific variety in regime transitions. In any given year several dozen countries change 
status. In 2017 alone, 24 countries advanced and another 24 regressed. In Europe over the 
past ten years negative change has outweighed improvements. Albania joined the group 
of liberal democracies, but four EU member states – Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Slovakia – lost their status of liberal democracies to become electoral democracies, while 
Serbia fared even worse and became an electoral authoritarian state.    
 
“Gaming” the system 
As this paper focuses on cultural values and principles in European foreign policy, we 
need to look more closely at one set of findings. Between 2007 and 2017 important changes 
have taken place in liberal and electoral democracies. On the positive side, formal aspects 
of democracy have improved. The number of multiparty elections, for example, has 
grown. Yet at the same time a countervailing trend has emerged: democratic values have 
suffered as media freedom, independent institutions, and the rule of law are being  
curtailed. A paradox, no doubt, but one that is fairly easy to explain. National elections are 
high-profile events that attract international attention. By comparison, incremental  
restrictions on local journalists, NGOs, academics, or the judiciary often pass under the 
radar of foreign media. Each step may appear relatively insignificant, but the cumulative 
effect is to impair democratic rights and liberties.60 Authoritarian leaders are, in effect, 
learning how to game the system and erode democracy by stealth – including in Europe.  
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Hungary’s 2018 parliamentary elections exemplify the trend. The OSCE’s election ob-
servation mission reported that, although the technical administration of the elections was 
professional and transparent, the elections were characterised by  
 
“a pervasive overlap between state and ruling party resources, undermining contest-
ants’ ability to compete on an equal basis. Voters had a wide range of political options 
but intimidating and xenophobic rhetoric, media bias and opaque campaign financing 
constricted the space for genuine political debate, hindering voters’ ability to make a 
fully-informed choice.”61  
 
Serbia’s 2017 presidential election is another case in point. The OSCE/ODIHR election 
assessment mission found that although the election provided voters with a genuine 
choice of contestants, who were able to campaign freely,  
 
“the campaign was dominated by the candidate from the governing coalition, and con-
current prime minister, who benefited from the effectively blurred distinction between 
campaign and official activities. Unbalanced media coverage and credible allegations of 
pressure on voters and employees of state-affiliated structures and a misuse of admin-
istrative resources tilted the playing field. Regulatory and oversight mechanisms were 
not effectively utilized to safeguard the fairness of competition.”62  
 
Such efforts to evade and weaken the core values of liberal democracy should be a 
cause of concern for all democrats, and particularly for Europeans. Democracy implies 
more than the technically competent holding of elections. It also entails checks and bal-
ances by independent and effective institutions, including a free judiciary, a free press, 
and free civil society organisations. Democracy, human rights, and the rule of law form  
a triad: to weaken one of the three dimensions is to diminish the whole. In the words of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: 
 
“Democracy, rule of law and human rights can be seen as three partly overlapping cir-
cles. (…) There can be no democracy without the rule of law and respect for human 
rights; there can be no rule of law without democracy and respect for human rights, 
and no respect for human rights without democracy and the rule of law.”63 
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The EU Treaty concurs. Article 2 reads:  
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.”  
 
Any country wishing to join the European Union must comply with the Copenhagen 
accession criteria, which require, inter alia: “stability of institutions guaranteeing democ-
racy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”64 
 
The EU is more than the single market and the single currency. As the Treaty makes 
clear, the European Union is first and foremost a community of values. Its principal pur-
pose is to protect human dignity by means of democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law. The rise of illiberal democracy therefore strikes at the heart of the European project. 
Policies to turn this tide should be at the top of the political agenda. They require concert-
ed action both by EU institutions and by the national guardians of democracy: govern-
ments, parliaments, judges, and citizens.  
 
Such action does not come easy to the EU. In theory, all member states have signed up 
to the values enshrined in the Treaty; in practice it is difficult for the EU to make them 
respect their engagements. The EU has been more successful in getting candidate coun-
tries to respect the rule of law (to a degree) than in getting its own member states to com-
ply. Still, the EU is not powerless. The European Commission has taken both Poland and 
Hungary to the European Court of Justice. The Commission has also proposed a mecha-
nism that would allow the majority of member states to cut EU funding to governments 
that trample the rule of law.65 There is a proposal on the table for a Justice, Rights and 
Values Fund that would allow the EU to support democracy promotion by NGOs in cer-
tain circumstances. Human rights organisations point out, however, that the rules are so 
restrictive that the fund, as currently proposed, may well be largely useless.  
 
Democracy is too precious and too vulnerable to be left in the care of politicians alone. 
To counter the gradual erosion of democratic liberties the role of citizens will be absolute-
ly crucial. As democracy’s ultimate stakeholders it is for citizens to raise their voice in 
protest at democracy’s detractors, and in solidarity with the victims of autocracy. The 
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price for doing so can be high, as prisoners from Turkey to Russia will testify, and the 
courage shown by those who stand up to defend democracy merits active support from 
fellow-citizens both at home and abroad.  
 
A type of democratic rot is setting in, not only in far-flung places, but even within EU 
member states. The rot is spreading as autocrats learn from foreign examples and copy 
techniques that work. President Trump’s efforts to deter scrutiny by US media (“fake 
news”) are being emulated across the world, from Malaysia to Turkmenistan. Restrictions 
on foreign NGOs are proliferating, from Belarus to Cambodia. Hungary’s limits on judi-
cial independence have inspired similar restrictions in Poland.  
 
These are not isolated cases; they are part of a growing, international trend, and inter-
national action is indispensable to stop the contagion. As democracy is being undermined 
across borders, initiatives to defend and strengthen democratic liberties must similarly be 
organised across borders. Where problems go, solutions must follow. To preserve our 
own liberties we need to help protect those of our neighbours.  
 
Among other things this will imply a re-thinking of what it means to be a citizen in a 
democracy. Citizenship, in today’s interdependent world, can no longer be conceived in 
exclusively national terms. Citizenship of the nation-state will increasingly need to ac-
quire a cross-border dimension. The challenge will be to develop this dimension so that 
people embrace it as an extension of national citizenship, and not in opposition to it. Shap-
ing this change will be a work of many hands, including teachers and other educators. 
Artists and cultural organisations can do much to bring innovative practices to the fore, 
create free spaces for dialogue, and set the tone of the debate. Later sections of this paper 
will explore two aspects of such 21st century citizenship: the European dimension and the 
global one. They will also discuss the evolving role and responsibility of educators and 
artists as enablers of democracy. First and foremost, however, the authoritarian attacks on 
democracy must be met with a much more vigorous defence of free speech and other 
human rights. 
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4. Human rights under attack   
Is the post-1945 era of international institutions and international law drawing to a close? 
Have we perhaps even entered the “endtimes” of human rights?66 At first sight, the signs 
are ominous. Open societies, where citizens are free to speak, write, meet, and criticise 
their leaders, are under attack. 
 
Dictatorships have long been notorious for the killing of journalists. In 2018, journal-
ists investigating corruption were murdered even in Malta and Slovakia. Dozens of coun-
tries around the world have passed laws and taken measures to curtail the work of civil 
society organisations.67 Government pressure forced the Konrad Adenauer Foundation to 
close its offices in Ecuador; the British Council has had to downgrade its presence in Mos-
cow. Human rights groups face an unprecedented global crackdown.  
 
At the same time, international institutions charged with defending rights and free-
doms are being undermined from within. Russia has stopped paying its contribution to 
the Council of Europe in retaliation to the suspension of its voting rights in the Parliamen-
tary Assembly (PACE) after its illegal annexation of Crimea. Burundi withdrew from the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); other countries ignore 15 outstanding ICC arrest 
warrants and surrender requests, including that of the Sudanese president Omar  
al-Bashir, who stands accused of war crimes. The British Foreign Office warns that China 
and Russia “are attacking the human rights functions within the UN system”, and that 
China is using the Human Rights Council to promote its “alternative vision of human 
rights”.68  
 
In Egypt, president al-Sisi gets away with torture and oppression, having no doubt 
noted EU Council President Tusk’s appreciation for the fact that illegal migration from 
Egypt to Europe fell from almost 13,000 in 2016 to almost none in 2018.69  
 
The picture is not all black, however. Human rights law does bite. In 2016 an ad hoc 
tribunal in Dakar found the former Chadian president Hissène Habré guilty of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. The International Tribunals for Rwanda and the For-
                                               
66 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
67 Thomas Carothers and Saskia Brechenmacher, Closing Space (Washington: Carnegie Foundation, 
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68 Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain: Human rights and the rule of law (London: House of      
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mer Yugoslavia gave a voice to victims of war crimes and genocide. The International 
Criminal Court reminds future perpetrators of mass atrocities and aggression that they 
will be held individually accountable. In 1977 only 17 countries had abolished the death 
penalty; today, 140 have – nearly two-thirds of countries in the world.70   
 
Nor should long-term developments be overlooked. Weak and disappointing as inter-
national human rights law may be, we are no longer living in a world without rules, the 
world Thomas Hobbes saw as condemned to live in a perpetual state of war. In only a few 
decades, most of the world’s sovereign states have agreed to abide by treaties that set out 
the right to a life lived in dignity. The numbers tell the story.  
 
  There are 172 parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
China has signed, but not ratified.  
  The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has 169 
state parties. The United States signed but did not ratify.  
  The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment has 164 state parties; India signed but did not ratify.  
  The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
has been joined by 189 states; only eight failed to ratify, including the USA.  
  A total of 123 states have so far joined the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and the USA are 
among the countries that have declined. 
  Most UN member states (116) have also ratified the Optional Protocol to the  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows individuals to 
lodge complaints. Countries that have taken no action include India, Japan, the 
United States, and a single EU member state: the United Kingdom.  
  The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights entered into force in 2013. It has been ratified by 23 states; an-
other 26 have signed but not yet ratified. The EU has a spotty record: thus far on-
ly eight member states have joined.71  
  
                                               
70 Kathryn Sikkink, The Long Arc of Human Rights: A Case for Optimism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2017). 
71 Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain. 
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  EU member states have shown a similar reluctance to allow citizens to invoke 
their rights under the European Social Charter. All EU states have ratified the 
Charter, but only 15 of them have granted their citizens access to the collective 
complaints procedure.72 Germany, so often in the forefront of European efforts to 
enforce human rights, is not yet a party to either instrument.  
As this brief overview illustrates, a minority of states remain outside some or most of 
the global human rights regime. This group includes autocracies such as Saudi Arabia and 
China. But the major international human rights treaties have been ratified by the majority 
of states, representing all regions of the world. Governments may fail to comply, but 
when they do, victims invariably invoke the global standards. Human rights are clearly 
not just a European construct that lacks legitimacy outside the West.  
 
Still, some notable anomalies persist. Among democratic countries, India’s absence 
from the Torture Convention and the ICC is particularly striking, as is the United States’ 
reluctance to ratify the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and to join the ICC. There is also considerable irony in the reluctance of European 
governments to grant their citizens access to international human rights complaints mech-
anisms. If democratic countries are to be successful in their international efforts to safe-
guard human rights, they must lead by example. Credibility begins at home.  
 
Human rights are central to Europe’s identity. The European Union is founded on the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities (Article 
2, Treaty on European Union). These values, the Treaty says, are common to the Member 
States. Human rights are central to how Europeans see their role in the world. The Mem-
ber States want the Union's action on the international scene to be  
 
“guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and en-
largement (…): democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and interna-
tional law.” (Art. 21, TEU)  
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Under international law states have the duty to respect, fulfil and protect human 
rights. They must take care not to violate the rights; take all measures necessary for their 
citizens to enjoy the rights; and take steps to prevent other states from violating them. 
How does the EU measure up?  
 
Respect 
The European human rights regime is one of the most stringent in the world. The Europe-
an Court of Justice (ECJ) sees to it that the 28 EU member states respect human rights as 
general principles of European law, and that they abide by the EU Charter of Human 
Rights. Some of the most notable cases have involved terrorism. In a series of landmark 
cases the Court has ruled that governments and the EU must respect the right to privacy 
in the fight against terrorism, and that suspects of terrorism are entitled to due process. 
The ECJ also verifies if governments respect the rule of law. In October 2018 it ordered 
Poland to suspend changes to its Supreme Court which violated the rule of law. The ECJ 
lets itself be guided by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which 
has jurisdiction in the 47 countries of the Council of Europe.  
 
Fulfil   
The European Court of Human Rights cannot effectively protect human rights on its own. 
Its rulings must be carried out by national authorities who often drag their feet. Thou-
sands of human rights judgments are still waiting to be implemented. 73 Often, it takes 
pressure from civil society and the media to make the authorities budge. The EU could 
help by supporting local NGOs and journalists to monitor European human rights law. 
European foundations, NGOs and cultural institutes could help to raise awareness – but 
some of them would need to take an interest first. Take, for example, the case of the Turk-
ish publisher Fatih Tas. Tas has long published books and periodicals that irk the Turkish 
authorities, who try to silence him. Five times he has taken Turkey to the European Court 
of Human Rights, and five times the Court ruled in his favour. A gesture of support from 
the European Publishers Council, or a similar NGO, would not be remiss.74    
 
All EU member states have accepted the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. They must therefore prevent and eradicate all 
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forms of racial discrimination and incitement to racial hatred. There is a growing pile of 
EU documents that attest to their determination to do so, and stand up for European 
values. But the evidence shows that Europeans are falling short. Europe’s collective failure 
to control discrimination is affecting its credibility in the eyes of the world. 
 
Racial discrimination and harassment in Europe are commonplace. People of African 
descent face systematic racism and discrimination in labour markets, housing, and 
healthcare.75 Muslims too face discrimination, harassment, and hate crimes.76 Anti-Semitic 
abuse in Europe has become so common that many victims no longer bother to report the 
incidents. A recent survey by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency found that 28% of 
Jewish respondents in 12 member states had experienced harassment, 40% worry about 
physical attack, and 89% considered anti-Semitism online a problem in their country.77  
On the day the report was published police in Rome said it was investigating the theft of 
20 memorial plaques commemorating the Holocaust. The small brass plaques, dedicated 
to members of a Jewish family, De Consiglio, had been dug out from the pavement.78  
 
Europe has other unfinished business. Authoritarian rulers who are looking to sup-
press criticism often turn to European surveillance technology, and European companies 
are happy to oblige. The British arms manufacturer BAE Systems used its Danish subsidi-
ary to export cyber-surveillance systems to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Morocco 
and Algeria. BAE’s ‘Evident’ system had previously been used by Tunisia’s strongman 
Ben Ali to stifle opposition.79 Turkey and Bahrain are reported to have used software from 
the German firm FinFisher to monitor critics.80 When governments order cyber surveil-
lance systems, they claim it is needed to fight terrorism. But such technology is dual-use 
and can just as easily be used to stamp out peaceful opposition. In 2016 the European 
Commission proposed to change European export control rules to prevent technology 
from being used in human rights violations.81 In 2018 EU governments were still discuss-
ing the idea. 
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Protect 
What else can Europe do to push back against oppression across the world? A first priori-
ty for EU diplomats could be to urge more countries to join the main international human 
rights regimes. The USA under President Trump is probably a lost case, but it is hard to 
think of a reason why countries like India or Singapore could not be persuaded to join the 
UN Convention Against Torture, or why Malaysia must remain outside the UN Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. And, occasional outbursts from Washington grandees not-
withstanding, there is no reason why the EU should not continue urging its partners to 
end impunity for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide by joining the ICC.  
 
Around the world victims of oppression look to Europe for support, but too often  
Europeans fail them. There is no lack of glowing EU policy statements about human 
rights; delivery is where Europe tends to come up short. In countries that violate human 
rights EU governments and the European institutions sometimes follow a good cop, bad 
cop routine, whereby national diplomats discuss trade and security but leave more con-
troversial subjects such as human rights to the European Commission. Foreign govern-
ments tend to be familiar with the ritual and graciously allow the Europeans to punch 
below their collective weight.    
 
There is a time for quiet diplomacy but there is also a time to speak out in support of 
victims of oppression, and European diplomats should do so more often. They could, for 
example, use the annual United Nations Human Rights Days to issue a statement or host a 
public meeting with writers, journalists, artists, or human rights campaigners. Ambassa-
dors from European countries could pack a punch by speaking out on World Press Free-
dom Day (3 May) in capitals around the world. They could mark the occasion of the In-
ternational Day for Universal Access to Information (28 September) to recall the Sustaina-
ble Development Goal (SDG) 16 and its promise to give citizens access to information. 
European diplomats could raise their voice on the International Day to End Impunity for 
Crimes against Journalists (2 November), or on 10 December – International Human 
Rights Day. A little courage can go a long way.  
 
Academic freedom 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought. Freedom to explore ideas is fundamental to 
a free society, and nowhere more so than in research and education. This freedom is un-
der pressure around the world. The Scholars at Risk Network has documented hundreds 
of attacks on academic freedom. These include killings, violence and disappearances of 
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scholars, staff and students; wrongful prosecution and imprisonment, loss of position and 
expulsion from study, travel restrictions, and university closures in 47 countries.82 
 
Anthropologist Homa Hoodfar was incarcerated for months in an Iranian prison cell. 
Undaunted, she still found a way to write. “As I had no pen and paper, I used the tail end 
of my toothbrush as a pen and the walls of my cell as a writing pad and desk.” The subject 
Hoodfar wrote about was academic freedom, which she describes as a table with four 
legs. The first one is the freedom to do research and to teach. The second leg is the free-
dom for students to do the same. The third one is the right to participate in the managing 
of academic institutions so that they are not swayed by commercial interests, and the 
fourth leg is the right of academics and members of learning institutions to act as public 
intellectuals.83 
 
Such freedom is a cornerstone of liberal democracy. Those who repress scholarly  
research, teaching and writing do so to prevent citizens from thinking freely, sharing 
ideas, and challenging the status quo. Academic freedom needs defending, but Europe 
has often been missing in action. Some European universities and academic publishers 
prefer to look away, rather than to endanger lucrative arrangements in countries such as 
China. Cambridge University Press publishes China Quarterly, an academic journal.  
In 2017 it decided to take down over 300 articles from its Chinese website, at the request of 
its importer in China. It only agreed to reverse its decision after a storm of academic pro-
test. The German publishing group Springer Nature agreed to remove more than 1,000 
articles from the websites of the Journal of Chinese Political Science and International 
Politics, two Springer journals, on the Chinese market. The articles contained keywords 
deemed politically sensitive by the Chinese authorities, including “Taiwan”, “Tibet” and 
“Cultural Revolution”.84 Springer Nature did not reverse its decision. The University of 
Nottingham Ningbo China, the first joint venture university in China, has removed a 
foreign academic from its management board after the Chinese Communist Party objected 
to renewal of his contract.85  
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European governments, too, could show a little more spine. In January 2016 Turkish 
academics known as Academics for Peace published a petition entitled “We will not be a 
party to this crime,” which condemned anti-terror policies in the south-eastern part of 
Turkey and urged the authorities to resume peace negotiations. Hundreds of signatories 
were subsequently charged under anti-terrorism laws. In the wake of the coup attempt, 
later that year, more than 6,000 academics have been dismissed from their posts; hun-
dreds have been detained or arrested. In both cases the EU’s feeble response failed to 
impress Ankara.    
 
The increasing virulent attacks on academic freedom deserve a more vigorous  
European response. EU ministers of education should recognise the importance of aca-
demic freedom as a cornerstone of education. The Foreign Affairs Council should include 
academic freedom in the EU’s international dialogues on human rights, as the European 
Parliament proposed.86 The European Commission should also play its part. A few EU 
countries operate small schemes to provide sanctuary and assistance to scholars at risk. 
There is little coordination and the schemes lack visibility. An EU-wide scheme would not 
be difficult to conceive.  
 
The right to culture 
Academic freedom is a dimension of the wider right of everyone to take part in cultural 
life. This fundamental right is under threat both from authoritarian governments and 
from violent fundamentalists. When Egypt incarcerated the poet Galal El Behairy for 
writing a song critical of government policies, when jihadist groups banned music in 
Northern Mali, when China arrested five Hong Kong booksellers, or when Russia silenced 
the Ukrainian filmmaker Olav Sentsov by arresting him on terrorism charges, to cite just 
some cases out of many, they were striking at cultural freedom. Freedom of expression is 
perhaps the most basic human right. It is the right on which all other rights depend.87 
Freedom of expression is what dictators trample when they silence the voices of journal-
ists, writers, singers, filmmakers and other artists. It is telling that artists who reach large 
numbers of people, such as musicians and filmmakers, are among the most vulnerable.88 
As spaces for cultural freedom are shrinking in many parts of the world, cultural freedom 
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needs champions. Could there be a more suitable priority for European cultural diploma-
cy?  
 
Cultural freedom is firmly anchored in international law. It is protected under Article 
27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15(3) of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Article 19(2) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. It is closely related to other rights, such as the right to 
education (Articles 13 and 14, ICESCR), through which individuals and communities pass 
on their values, religion, customs, language and other cultural references.89  
 
Like all human rights, the right to take part in cultural life and creative activity re-
quires from states both abstention (non-violation) and positive action (facilitation and 
promotion of cultural life; access to and preservation of material and immaterial culture). 
Under international law these two requirements are core obligations, applicable with 
direct effect. States must  
 
“respect and protect the right of everyone to engage in their own cultural practices, 
while respecting human rights which entails, in particular, respecting freedom of 
thought, belief and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; a person’s right to use 
the language of his or her choice; freedom of association and peaceful assembly; and 
freedom to choose and set up educational establishments.”  
 
States must also “eliminate any barriers or obstacles that inhibit or restrict a person’s 
access to the person’s own culture or to other cultures, without discrimination and with-
out consideration for frontiers of any kind.”90  
 
European initiatives could be instrumental in two respects: the EU could use political 
pressure to promote the respect of cultural freedom, and it could engage in partnerships 
to support public and private cultural action. At the moment, the EU does a little bit of 
both, its policies mostly driven by low-level bureaucratic entrepreneurship. In 2014 EU 
ministers adopted guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, but application 
by national diplomats has been haphazard.  
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Across the world, journalists often bear the brunt of official policies to silence criticism 
and gag independent voices. In 2018, the Committee to Protect Journalists reports, 251 
journalists were imprisoned, and 54 were killed. Turkey, China, and Egypt were  
responsible for more than half of those jailed around the world for the third year in a 
row.91 Impunity for crimes against journalists remains the norm, with justice in only one 
in ten cases.92 China runs the largest and most sophisticated internet censorship operation 
in the world, and its big firewall is being emulated from Vietnam to Ethiopia. In many 
countries (including European ones), public service broadcasting is under threat and 
licencing of private broadcasters lacks transparency. Worldwide, respect for freedom of 
expression and information is at its lowest point in ten years. 
 
The EU, to its credit, pushes back. Among other things it has stepped up support to 
independent media in the Western Balkans and funds initiatives such as the European 
Centre for Press and Media Freedom (Leipzig), the European Journalism Centre (Maas-
tricht) and UNESCO’s International Program for the Development of Communication. 
European broadcasters such as the BBC and Deutsche Welle do important work to train 
journalists around the world. Some EU governments chip in: the Dutch government sup-
ports NGOs such as Free Press Unlimited and Hivos (Digital Defenders Partnership). But 
neither EU governments nor the different Directorates General of the European Commis-
sion have a policy framework to defend and promote artistic freedom around the world.93 
The EU also still lacks an integrated, joined up approach to freedom of expression. On the 
ground in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, coordination between member states (and 
with the European Commission) tends to happen by default rather than design.  
Cross-border learning and inter-sectoral learning happen incidentally, not systematically. 
Here, as elsewhere, there is still much potential for European cultural diplomacy.  
 
Perhaps Europe’s biggest challenge is to break down the silos that separate cultural 
policy from human rights policy, and development aid from diplomacy. Too often, the 
pace of events is not matched by the pace of national and EU decision-making. This is 
most notable when political circumstances improve, and when the EU could make a dif-
ference by responding generously and creatively.  
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For positive things do happen. There are countries that manage to buck the down-
ward trend. In 2018 space for civil society improved in Ecuador, Ethiopia, the Gambia, 
Liberia, Lithuania, Malaysia and Somalia.94 Between 2014-2017, media freedom improved 
in Fiji, the Gambia, Macedonia, Namibia, and South Korea; digital freedom also improved 
in Botswana, the Central African Republic, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka.95 
 
Such positive changes do not herald a sea change, but they do present opportunities 
for the EU to act. When political circumstances improve is when foreign assistance is most 
likely to make a difference. As a rule, EU diplomacy is not yet sufficiently nimble to re-
spond to rapid changes in human rights regimes. Too often the Commission, the Europe-
an External Action Service and the member states are tied down by rigid bureaucratic 
rules on the one hand, and the slow machinery of Council working groups on the other. 
When Tunisians toppled Ben Ali in 2011, it took painfully long for the EU to respond. 
What is needed is a rapid response mechanism that will allow the EU and EU govern-
ments to scale up financial support, technical assistance, and cultural cooperation to coun-
tries that improve their human rights record.  
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5. Digital disorder 
“Fake news” is one of the defining issues of our time. On the internet, sensationalist and 
misleading stories fuel conspiracy theories and mistrust as never before. Spreading fake 
news is one of the cyber-based techniques that states use to disrupt competitors and  
opponents, along with espionage, sabotage, and propaganda.  
 
As a practice, information manipulation is nothing new. Politicians have long been 
known to use the truth selectively, and advertisers do this for a living. What is new,  
however, is the scale of today’s disinformation, the extent to which it is being used by 
governments and political leaders, and the corrosive effect this has on trust in democratic 
societies.  
 
News used to travel at the speed of transmission by newspapers, radio, and television. 
Today, the internet and social media spread information instantly to millions across the 
globe; their scope and speed are unprecedented. Lies, unfortunately, travel fastest of all: 
six times faster than truth, according to research done at MIT.96  
 
The electronic media have amplified the ability of governments to influence the 
thoughts and emotions of their target audiences at home and abroad. More and more 
governments use this capacity to manipulate and control. From China to Turkey, digital 
authoritarianism is on the rise. Governments censor electronic media or block them alto-
gether to prevent their citizens from spreading or accessing criticism or “cultural pollu-
tion” from abroad; systems of artificial intelligence and security cameras are used to con-
trol behaviour. Russian trolls and bots spread disinformation far and wide.  
 
Disinformation makes it more difficult to distinguish truth from falsehoods. It rein-
forces distrust at a time when trust in most democratic countries is already at a low point. 
More Americans get their news from social media than from newspapers, but a majority 
find it difficult to distinguish between truth and online disinformation.97 More than a third 
of young people in the UK report that they find it difficult to tell the difference between 
truth and lies on social media; a similar proportion say that social media had made them 
feel more negatively about politics.98 
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Informed political choice depends on reasoned debate. When facts become opinions, 
and opinions facts, democracy suffers. This is a particular problem on social media, where 
algorithms drive revenues by getting users to access material that bolsters their existing 
views and prejudices.  
 
That said, it is important to distinguish between the responsibility of governments and 
that of online communication platforms. Some governments intentionally spread disin-
formation; social media sometimes allow this to happen. The distinction tends to slip from 
sight when both phenomena are referred to as fake news. This is one reason why the term 
“fake news” is best avoided. Another reason is its use by President Trump.  
 
Since Donald Trump launched the term “fake news” to delegitimise journalists and 
media, the practice has been embraced enthusiastically by politicians around the world to 
silence critical voices. Research at Oxford University found that in 2017 the term was used 
by political leaders in Burma, Cambodia, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Somalia, 
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, the USA and Venezuela. In Tanzania, for example, 
several independent newspapers and radio stations were shut down or suspended be-
cause of what President Magufuli considered “inaccurate” reporting.99 The old Nazi slur 
of “Lügenpresse” has found a world-wide following.  
 
Now that the term “fake news” has become an instrument of censorship it is best to 
avoid the concept. The European Union uses the term “disinformation” instead. Disin-
formation is understood as verifiably false or misleading information that is created, pre-
sented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and 
may cause public harm. Public harm includes threats to democratic processes as well as to 
public goods such as health, environment or security. Disinformation does not include 
inadvertent errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and commen-
tary.100 
 
Disinformation is practiced systematically by Russia, which uses it to disrupt liberal 
democracies.   
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Russia 
Russian military doctrine explicitly endorses information warfare as a military tactic.101 
Russian nationalists regret the loss of territory and status following the demise of the 
Soviet Union, which they attribute to hostile Western intentions. They see Russia as under 
permanent attack from Western ideology and information operations. In defence, Russia 
must deploy its own information tactics, including “dezinformatsiya”, against the USA and 
Europe. Russia uses traditional instruments such as the state-owned satellite TV channel 
RT and the news agency Sputnik, but also cyber-operations. Fancy Bear, a Russian cyber 
group, hacked the servers of the Democratic Party in the USA and released emails to 
WikiLeaks to damage Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign.  
 
Analysis commissioned by the US Senate shows that Russia used accounts under fake 
names on every major social media platform to influence the 2016 US Presidential election 
(Facebook, Google+, Instagram, PayPal, Pinterest, Reddit, Tumblr, Twitter, Vine, 
YouTube). Conservative voters were targeted with posts on immigration, gun rights, and 
race. The most prolific efforts targeted African Americans to suppress votes for Hillary 
Clinton. The researchers found that the messaging sought to benefit the Republican Party 
and specifically Donald Trump.102 
 
It is Europe, however, that bears the brunt of Russian information operations. Russian 
social media sowed confusion about the role of Russian forces in seizing Crimea and ran a 
campaign to blame the Ukrainian government for the destruction of Malaysia Airline 
Flight 17. Russian state television promoted a story according to which a 13-year old Rus-
sian-German girl had been raped by migrants. After German police found the story to be 
untrue Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov used it to criticise Germany. The Lisa case fuelled 
the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany. On 22 March 2016, the day terrorists 
killed 32 people in Brussels, Russian-linked Twitter accounts spread hashtags as #islamis-
theproblem, #Islamkills, and #StopIslam, which became one of the top five trending topics 
in Belgium and the Netherlands. In France, Russian hackers released gigabytes of data – 
including forged emails – to harm Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 election campaign. In Swe-
den researchers identified dozens of forgeries and fake articles, including a forged letter 
allegedly written by the Minister of Defence announcing the sale of sophisticated weapons 
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to Ukraine.103 In Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine, Russia uses social media to drive 
wedges between ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking populations and their host  
governments, NATO, and the European Union.104 
 
Russian bots and trolls consistently strive to delegitimise the European Union, which 
is depicted as corrupt, decadent, duplicitous, impotent, and overrun by Muslims. In the 
UK, Russian media actively supported Brexit. In the Netherlands, they encouraged rejec-
tion of the European Union’s Association Agreement with Ukraine. Pro-Russian local 
media in the EU and the Balkans echo the anti-EU narratives.  
 
It is impossible to say with certainty how effective these disinformation campaigns 
are. Some are ham-fisted, such as the efforts to disrupt Macron’s election campaign, but 
on the whole they are well-organised and systematic. Between 2015 and 2017, for exam-
ple, information spread by Russian Twitter trolls was cited at least 30 times by leading 
news and opinion sites in the Netherlands.105 The EU has identified 3,500 examples of pro-
Kremlin disinformation contradicting publicly available facts repeated in many languages 
on many occasions. It concludes that “Russian disinformation can be extremely success-
ful.”106  
 
Russia’s efforts to wield soft power have been much less successful. Russia’s interna-
tional image is largely negative. A recent poll by the PEW Research Institute showed that 
it is viewed more unfavourably than favourably in 16 of the 25 countries surveyed, includ-
ing most of Europe. In only four countries do at least half of respondents express a posi-
tive view of Russia: the Philippines, Tunisia, South Korea, and Greece. At the same time, 
however, many say that Russia’s international stature is growing: four in ten respondents 
believe Russia is playing a more important role in the world today compared with ten 
years ago. 107 
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One reason why Russian disinformation campaigns must be taken seriously is that 
they tap into – and amplify – the growing lack of trust in liberal democracies. This distrust 
has many causes; some are political, others economic and social. One of the main causes is 
the role played by social media. While Russia spreads distrust intentionally, social media 
do so unintentionally.  
 
Social media 
On social media people pay with personal information for entertainment and news that 
they think is free. The resulting loss of privacy is a driver of distrust; doubt about the 
reliability of information on social media is another.  
 
Communication, as James Carey wrote, is culture.108 Today’s leading digital communi-
cation companies exercise extraordinary cultural power. Amazon has a 70% share of the 
ebook market. Google has an 88% market share in search advertising. Facebook (including 
Instagram, Messenger and WhatsApp) controls more than 70% of social media on mobile 
devices.109 Google dominates more than 90% of the world market for search engines.  
Facebook has more users than China has people.  
 
With so much power concentrated in so few hands, how can these digital giants be held to 
account? Some believe that technology can help to redress the balance between citizens 
and corporations. Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World-Wide Web, has launched a 
project to fix the internet. Dismayed by the abuse of privacy on the web, Berners-Lee 
wants to replace the current model where users have to hand over personal data to digital 
giants in exchange for perceived value. His initiative, called Solid (Social Linked Data) 
allows users to discover and share information without sacrificing privacy.110  
 
Others think that public authorities must intervene. This has been the dominant  
approach in Europe. The EU has agreed strict rules (General Data Protection Regulation) 
to make companies protect the personal information of their clients. The European Com-
mission has also fined Google a record-breaking 4.3 billion EUR for using Android to 
cement its market dominance. More could be done to tame the power of the oligopolies. 
The EU could, for example, require companies with more than a 10% share of any data-
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driven market to share anonymised slices of the data with other companies, as Mayer-
Schönberger and Range (2018) propose.111  
 
The EU has so far not adopted legislation to force digital traders to counter online dis-
information. Its preferred approach for the time being has been through self-regulation. 
The Commission has issued an EU Code of Practice to mobilise the private sector against 
disinformation.112 This approach may have its benefits. As an unintended side-effect it 
might even induce platforms such as Facebook, Google, YouTube and Twitter to take 
steps to respect and promote human rights. The global standard for companies who take 
rights seriously is set by the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These 
Principles, which have been endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, invite compa-
nies to prevent and address human rights abuses linked to their business activity. Com-
panies should, inter alia, conduct human rights due diligence and provide remediation, 
including through accessible, operational grievance mechanisms.113  
 
But the EU’s approach is not without risks. By obliging social media companies to act 
as gate-keepers who must filter out undesirable content, governments are delegating 
regulatory functions to private companies. This way of privatising public responsibilities 
raises two problems. Companies may be tempted to filter out lawful content in order to 
avoid liability. This is already happening. Facebook bans advertisements with sexually 
oriented content, including artistic or educational nudes. This led it to remove ads from 
the Flemish Tourist Board which contained “nude” material – a painting by Peter Paul 
Rubens of Jesus taken down from the cross, wearing a loincloth. In a playful response, the 
Flemish Tourist Board released a video in which the “nude police” chase away visitors at 
the Rubens House in Antwerp. But it also expressed regret that it could not show its 
unique cultural heritage on the world’s most popular social network. The wider risks to 
freedom of expression of delegating gate-keeping to social media are clear. It would be a 
sad irony if Europe, trying to defend its citizens against disinformation, would end up 
indirectly limiting their freedom of speech.  
 
The second problem of delegating public responsibility to private companies is that of 
accountability. Governments are democratically accountable to citizens; companies are at 
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best accountable to their share-holders.114 The secrecy with which Facebook and other 
social media surround their data makes external scrutiny extremely difficult. An official 
investigation in the UK concluded that Facebook had not been sufficiently transparent to 
enable users to understand how and why they might be targeted by a political party or 
campaign.115 The European Commission agrees that social media have failed to act pro-
portionally to the challenge posed by disinformation and the manipulative use of their 
platforms.116  
 
In any case, self-regulation and voluntary instruments will probably not bring the  
digital traders to change their business model, which depends on selling the data that 
users voluntarily or unwittingly provide. Genuine transparency and accountability, in-
cluding accessible means of redress, are still being resisted and will probably require 
government regulation. Some governments, including Germany, have already started 
down this path. The British parliament wants audits carried out on the non-financial 
aspects of technology companies, including their security mechanisms and algorithms, to 
make sure that they are operating responsibly.117 At some point European legislation may 
be needed to provide a level playing field.  
 
Each of these approaches – technology, regulation, and self-regulation – may help to 
combat disinformation. But ultimately things are down to individual users: citizens must 
feel empowered to detect and prevent disinformation. People need to understand the risks 
and feel confident to avoid them. Media training can help build cognitive resilience, the 
necessary skills and attitudes to resist manipulation in social or traditional media. Media 
literacy can play a critical role in young people’s civic engagement.118 Schools and univer-
sities should take the lead, but many are cash-strapped and few will have budgeted for 
this. The EU has proposed a Digital Competence Framework for Citizens. It also launched 
a small pilot project, Media Literacy for All, but any substantial financial support will 
have to come from national institutions. Cultural organisations and NGOs, which have 
mostly remained on the sidelines of this debate, could do much to raise awareness.  
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Citizens also need access to easily accessible, trustworthy sources of information, both 
online and off-line. Independent, non-partisan journalism is a public good. Democracy 
cannot function without it, as autocrats know only too well. Such journalism is expensive, 
particularly if it serves mass markets. Crowd-funding can sometimes be successful, as The 
Guardian shows, but this works best in large and liquid language markets such as English. 
Citizens need information in their mother tongue, and this puts people in minority lan-
guages at a disadvantage.  
 
Quality journalism needs public support, including in Europe. The EU’s Creative Eu-
rope programme can support media diversity but it is small and underfunded. EU gov-
ernments will have to step in and contribute.  
6. Culture and development 
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6. Culture and development 
The cultural and creative industries are among the fastest growing sectors in the world. 
With an estimated global worth of 4.3 trillion USD per year, the culture sector now  
accounts for 6.1% of the global economy. Cultural and creative industries generate nearly 
30 million jobs worldwide, employing more people aged 15 to 29 than any other sector.119 
 
In many countries the cultural and creative sectors provide an income to the poorest 
and most vulnerable. In Morocco, employment in the publishing sector alone represents 
1.8% of the labour force. In Honduras 5% of the cultural sector represents 5% of the  
economy. In Mali 5.8% of the population is employed in the cultural and creative sector, 
with crafts alone providing more than 100,000 jobs. In Indonesia the creative industries 
account for 7% of GDP (2010-2013).120 Music festivals, film festivals, and visits to cultural 
heritage sites generate heritage tourism, income, and jobs.121 
 
Poverty is a blight on freedom. For women and for men, the income and self-esteem 
generated by the cultural sector, is vital to fighting poverty and enhancing freedom. 
 
Culture’s role as a dimension of development was at the heart of the UN Decade for 
Cultural Development (1988-1997) which culminated in the seminal report “Our Creative 
Diversity”, produced by the World Commission on Culture and Development (1996).  
The link between culture and development was underlined again in the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
Article 14 mentions four ways in which governments can foster a dynamic cultural sector 
to support sustainable development and poverty reduction: (i) strengthening cultural 
industries, (ii) capacity building, (iii) technology transfer, and (iv) financial support. The 
Convention, which specifies concrete undertakings in each of these four areas, has been 
ratified by 145 countries. The UN General Assembly has emphasised culture’s potential to 
contribute to sustainable development on no fewer than 13 occasions.122 UNESCO, too, has 
long advocated greater recognition of the role of culture in development. 
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Such recognition has been a long time in the making, and many would argue it is yet 
to be fully achieved. Countries found it difficult to translate their abstract commitment 
into policies and spending. In practice, governments in the global South did (and do) not 
always recognise the potential of the cultural sector as a vector of development. Many aid 
donors, too, have tended to treat cultural development as an optional extra. Multilateral 
agencies such as UNDP proved reluctant to invest. Nor has the World Bank been much 
involved, although it recently agreed to work with UNESCO in areas such as cultural 
heritage and creative industries.123 As UNESCO’s Evaluation Office reluctantly concluded, 
the recognition of the cultural aspects of development remains lower than that of the 
environmental dimension.124 
 
What could account for this complex relationship between the world of development 
and the world of culture? There may be several explanations. To begin with, there is little 
overlap in membership between the development community and the world of culture. 
Most cultural practitioners are unfamiliar with the world of development, and vice versa. 
The two communities rarely interact and synergies have not been easy to achieve. Efforts 
to explore common ground, such as the “dialogue of civilisations” or the “dialogue of 
cultures”125 have generated more talk than action. The same could be said for relations 
between cultural experts and ministries of finance or planning in the global South: they 
largely live in separate worlds.  
 
Perspectives also differ on the role of culture in development. While development 
specialists or policy planners may welcome cultural projects in terms of their potential to 
contribute to economic growth or other targets, cultural operators tend to be weary of 
such “instrumentalisation” and argue that culture must be treated as an end in itself. 
Another recurrent issue has been the perceived difficulty to agree on ways to measure 
culture’s contribution to development: aid workers and finance ministries tend to favour 
quantitative evidence whereas cultural operators often prefer more qualitative assess-
ments. A fourth complicating factor is the changing political climate in Western countries, 
where spending on development and on culture is increasingly being criticised and politi-
cised by right-wing opponents. In the UK, for example, newspapers such as The Sun ran a 
campaign ridiculing British financial support for an Ethiopian NGO that uses music and 
radio to spread awareness about girls’ rights. Headlines such as “Britain pays £5 million 
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to ‘Ethiopian Spice Girls’” prompted an MP to ask why the cash for the pop group was 
not spent on the UK’s elderly population. The British government scrapped the subsidy.126  
 
Perhaps the most poignant illustration of the tepid support for culture’s role in  
development, some might argue, is the adoption of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
 
UNESCO has spearheaded initiatives to integrate culture into sustainable develop-
ment. The 2013 Hangzhou Declaration, a key step in UNESCO’s advocacy to integrate 
culture into sustainable development,127 built on several UN General Assembly resolu-
tions on culture and development as well as efforts by others to recognise culture along 
with – and equal to – the economic, social, and environmental components.128 Parallel to 
UNESCO a global campaign advocated for the inclusion of culture as an explicit goal 
among other Sustainable Development Goals. Although the campaign’s Declaration was 
endorsed by over 900 organisations,129 and in spite of UNESCO’s tireless efforts, Agenda 
2030 fell short of the target. Culture failed to achieve recognition as a separate global goal, 
let alone as the fourth pillar of sustainable development.  
 
Such a pessimistic assessment would be wrong, however. It is true that Agenda 2030 
does not recognise culture as one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. However, the 
Agenda does mention culture explicitly in the preamble and in relation to four areas: 
education, economic growth, sustainable cities, and patterns of production and consump-
tion. This marks the first time that culture is included in the global development agenda, 
albeit in a somewhat underhanded way. 
 
  In the preamble of Agenda 2030 world leaders pledge to foster intercultural un-
derstanding. They acknowledge the natural and cultural diversity of the world 
and recognise that “all cultures and civilisations can contribute to, and are cru-
cial enablers of, sustainable development”.  
  Target 4.7 (quality education) states that by 2030, all learners should acquire the 
knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, 
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among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable 
lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and 
non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of 
culture’s contribution to sustainable development. 
  In Target 8.9 (decent work and economic growth) governments agreed to pro-
mote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and pro-
ducts. 
  Target 11.4 (sustainable cities and communities) states that governments will 
strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural  
heritage. 
  Target 12 B (responsible production and consumption) echoes Target 8.9, and 
states that countries will develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable 
development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes lo-
cal culture and products.   
In addition to the targets where culture is mentioned explicitly, some goals contain 
targets that, although they do not directly refer to culture, are critical to promoting cultur-
al rights and freedoms. Examples include targets 4.4 (skills), 5.5 (gender equality in  
leadership), 8.3 (creativity and innovation), and 10.2 (inclusiveness to minorities). Goal 16 
(peace, justice, and strong institutions) contains several such targets. 
 
  Target 16.6 commits governments to develop “effective, accountable and  
transparent institutions at all levels”. Accountability is unattainable without 
freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly – rights 
that are recognised and affirmed in the UN Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
  In target 16.7 governments undertook to ensure “responsive, inclusive, partici-
patory and representative decision-making at all levels”. Cultural policy making 
is covered by definition. There is compelling evidence that participation in cul-
ture also promotes democratic participation as well as empowerment and well-
being of citizens.130 
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  Target 16.10 aims to ensure public access to information and protect fundamen-
tal freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agree-
ments. One relevant indicator (16.10.2) is the number of countries that adopt and 
implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to 
information. Access to information is necessary to ensure the free flow of ideas 
in word and image, and EU aid should be targeted accordingly.  
  Another indicator under Target 16.10 is the number of verified cases of killing, 
kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of  
journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights  
advocates in the previous 12 months. UNESCO has started a campaign to  
combat violence against journalists and other media personnel. Supporting and  
co-financing this campaign should be a priority for all governments.131  
All in all, Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals provide plenty of  
opportunities for ambitious and comprehensive cultural policies. The SDGs imply that 
culture must be an integral part of policies to alleviate poverty, promote education, gen-
der equality, and sustainable urbanisation, and build peaceful societies that respect uni-
versal human rights.132 This is the most comprehensive agenda for culture the world has 
ever seen. 
 
Such huge opportunities, of course, come with equally significant risks. One of the 
principal risks is failure to realise the necessary integrated policies. 
 
The SDGs call for an integrated approach to culture, at international level as well as 
nationally. In this respect the cultural targets do not differ fundamentally from other 
objectives: the entire Agenda requires a holistic, joined-up approach to policy making and 
policy implementation. This is easier said than done. Holistic policy making and policy 
delivery is impossible without interdepartmental cooperation and coordination – the bane 
of any government. Agenda 2030 also demands unprecedented public-private coopera-
tion. Will Ministries of Culture sit down with Ministries of Foreign Affairs and develop-
ment agencies? Will governments reach out to civil society organisations, and vice versa? 
Will national cultural institutes be prepared to think outside the box?  
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If Agenda 2030 has an Achilles’ heel, it is ensuring cooperation and joined-up decision 
making. But coordination is not the only challenge. Delivering the SDGs will require 
resources, time, and sustained efforts. Also needed are transparency, accountability, and a 
willingness to learn. Perhaps most importantly, this agenda requires leadership. Ministers 
will have to assume personal responsibility, focus, and sustain their interest. So will lead-
ers of non-governmental organisations and businesses. This is not a job for the back office 
only.  
 
The role of the European Union  
In principle, the EU is well-placed to lead in realising Agenda 2030. The EU is one of the 
most prosperous regions of the world and EU governments would be able to lead by 
example. Together, EU member states and the Commission are also the world’s most 
prominent donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In its 2018 peer review of 
EU development policy the OECD concludes that the EU has “shown leadership” in its 
efforts to reach global agreements on sustainable development and climate change, as well 
as in shaping the international humanitarian landscape by taking an integrated approach 
towards crisis and fragility. Its joint programming, extensive use of budget support, and 
results based management based on country priorities are enhancing ownership and 
inclusiveness.133  
 
Unfortunately, this is not the whole story. In the field of culture the EU and most of its 
member states have lagged rather than led, including in terms of spending. The volume of 
international aid to culture has not increased; it has fallen. The latest available data from 
2015 for the OECD as a whole show that both the share of ODA to support creativity in 
developing countries and the share of ODA spent on culture have declined since 2010. The 
total amount of cultural ODA being donated has fallen from 465.9 million USD in 2005 to 
354.3 million USD in 2010, and to 257 million USD in 2015, a decrease of 45% in ten years. 
The top ten recipients of cultural ODA in 2015 were Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, 
Morocco, South Africa, Turkey, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza Strip – hardly the poorest 
countries in the global South.134  
 
These declining levels of aid from richer countries sit uneasily with the EU’s promise 
to mainstream culture in development.135 EU ministers have also committed the EU and 
                                               
133 OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: European Union 2018 (Paris: OECD, 2018). 
134 UNESCO, Re/Shaping Cultural Policies – 2005 Convention Global Report (Paris: UNESCO, 2018), p. 171. 
135 Council of the European Union, Conclusions on culture in the EU’s external relations with a focus on 
culture in development cooperation, Doc. 14443/15, 24 November 2015, p. 6. 
6. Culture and development 
56                                ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Cultural Freedom in European Foreign Policy 
its member states to the 2030 Agenda.136 It is time for EU governments and the European 
Commission to act on these promises. Action to help implement and finance Agenda 2030 
in the area of culture is long overdue.  
 
At long last, the Commission’s development Directorate General, DEVCO, is showing 
signs of taking culture more seriously. In 2018 it reinforced its unit in charge of culture, 
education, and health, although any major policy innovations will probably be postponed 
until the arrival of a new Commission in late 2019. 
 
One evident priority for the new Commission (2019-2024) would be to publish a white 
paper (or “communication”, in the jargon) on Culture in Sustainable Development. The 
EU currently manages a wide portfolio of mostly short-term cultural development pro-
jects, many of which predate the SDGs. There is no integral approach. Yet the whole point 
of the SDGs is to arrive at a unified approach to development. This is particularly im-
portant in the field of culture, which is covered in a multitude of goals and targets. With-
out a comprehensive approach the main benefit of the SDGs will be lost. The Commission 
should say, therefore, how it intends to use the EU budget to ensure the necessary com-
prehensive approach to the cultural aspects of Agenda 2030. It should also say how it will 
work with EU governments. Will there be synergy between the EU budget and the Euro-
pean Development Fund, financed by EU member states outside the EU budget? 
 
This is an area – culture as a dimension of sustainable development – where Europe, if 
it wants to, could lead the world. The newly elected European Parliament (2019-2024) 
should see to it that a policy paper is produced, and that its main conclusions will be 
agreed between the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament.  
 
Elements of a European approach to culture in development could include the role of 
culture in education (SDG 4), cultural governance (SDG 16.6 and 16.7), and culture as an 
aspect of peace and security (SDG 16.1 and 16.10). The following three sections offer a 
brief discussion. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
136 Council Conclusions on the EU response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (20 June 
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Culture and education (SDG 4) 
It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of education for a life well-lived. Education 
is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realising other human 
rights.  
 
“As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically and 
socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain 
the means to participate fully in their communities. Education has a vital role in em-
powering women, safeguarding children from exploitative and hazardous labour and 
sexual exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environ-
ment, and controlling population growth. Increasingly, education is recognized as one 
of the best financial investments States can make. But the importance of education is 
not just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and active mind, able to wander freely 
and widely, is one of the joys and rewards of human existence.”137 
 
Education figures prominently among the Sustainable Development Goals. SDG 4 is 
nothing short of ambitious: governments committed to ensure that, by 2030, all girls and 
boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to 
relevant and effective learning outcomes. 
 
As with all SDGs, financing these ambitious policies is first and foremost a responsi-
bility of national governments. International assistance can play a supporting role, in 
keeping with SDG 17. Education is one area where international assistance is needed. The 
total annual financing gap between the available domestic resources and the amount 
necessary to realise the global education targets is estimated at 39 billion USD between 
2015 and 2030 in low and lower middle income countries.138 Many EU member states 
provide educational aid as part of their development policies. The EU also supports coop-
eration in education, including through the Development Cooperation Instrument (devel-
oping countries) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (candidate countries). Another of 
its instruments, and one of the best known, is Erasmus. 
 
Erasmus+ is the EU’s programme which helps young people to study, train or learn 
abroad. Erasmus is open to students from Iceland, Liechtenstein, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, and Turkey. Conditional access is 
                                               
137 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to Education, General 
Comment No. 13 (1999), paragraph 1. 
138 Education 2030. Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action for the implementation of Sustaina-
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given to students from the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Montenegro), Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,  
Moldova, Ukraine), the Southern Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia) and Russia. The European Commission has 
proposed to double the Erasmus budget to 30 billion EUR (2021-2017) with  
25.9 billion EUR for education and training, 3.1 billion EUR for youth and 550 million EUR 
for sport.  
 
Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degrees were launched in 2004 and, since 2014, form 
part of Erasmus+. Since that first year, when just 140 students took part, more than 21,000 
students have now benefitted from an Erasmus Mundus Master scholarship. In 2017 the 
top five sending countries were Brazil (79), India (63), Iran (59), Bangladesh (58) and Mex-
ico (49). Erasmus Mundus thus helps to build cooperation and trust between the EU and 
the rest of the world, though with only 1,300 places for master students in 2017 this is a 
relatively small programme.  
 
EU funding will clearly be needed to meet the global development goals, and it will 
have to be earmarked and targeted accordingly. But in addition to providing money the 
EU should seize this opportunity to engage its foreign partners in dialogue and processes 
of mutual learning. The SDGs invite countries to enter into partnerships. This is one of the 
important differences with the Millennium Development Goals, which only addressed so-
called developing countries. The SDGs, by contrast, are about creating mutual commit-
ments, something fully in line with the EU’s preference for multilateralism.  
 
These mutual commitments should include European initiatives to improve 
knowledge of the non-Western world in Europe itself. History curricula in Europe mostly 
teach national history, with a smattering of European history; the history and social reality 
of other parts of the world still gets surprisingly little attention. The age of colonialism is 
long past but Eurocentrism still permeates European education.139 If educational institu-
tions, cultural organisations and governments in Europe are serious about the SDGs, a 
good way to start would be to bring a more global perspective to national education.   
 
Another promising area for dialogue and mutual learning is the role of culture in  
education.   
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Culture and education are closely connected. When mainstreamed in education, cul-
ture builds confidence and encourages dialogue. Cultural expressions are essential for the 
development of young people: they build self-confidence and critical skills, helping them 
to achieve better educational results.140 Artists help society to reflect on the human  
condition and improve it. 
 
Based on her research for UNESCO Anne Bamford has identified four ways for teach-
ers to boost arts and creativity in the classroom. “Education in the arts” means dedicated 
curriculum time to music, visual arts, drama, dance and the media. “Education through 
the arts” means integrating art into other subjects, such as languages, history, or science. 
“Art as education” uses art forms such as film, dance or theatre as a medium for learning, 
and “education as art” brings creative, cultural and aesthetic understanding of learning 
into teaching.141 
 
There is no single approach or best way to create synergies between culture and  
education. National circumstances differ and policies must differ accordingly. There is 
much scope for mutual learning, including between Europeans and non-Europeans –
learning is best practiced as a two-way process, and as a process between equals.  
 
One interesting experience Europeans could contribute to global exchanges is that of 
Ireland. Irish research has shown that children who take part in artistic and cultural  
activities cope better with schoolwork, have more positive attitudes towards school later 
on, are happier, have reduced anxiety, better academic skills and fewer socio-emotional 
difficulties than children who are less engaged. Acting on the research the Irish govern-
ment launched a programme, Creative Youth, to ensure that every child in Ireland has 
practical access to tuition, experience and participation in music, drama, art and coding 
(sic) by 2020.142 Ireland’s visionary experiment deserves to be included in the international 
dialogues that should be at the heart of European cultural diplomacy.  
 
Just as Agenda 2030 can play an important role in promoting access to education,  
education can play a role in promoting understanding of and critical support for the 
SDGs. Reflection on ways of teaching the SDGs in schools and universities is at an early 
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stage.143 This type of global citizenship education is another area where educators have 
much to learn from each other, both within the European Union and beyond.  
 
By working together to develop global citizenship education the EU and its partners 
would be acting in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says: 
 
“Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to 
the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall pro-
mote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious 
groups (…).”144  
 
Global citizenship education and promoting the arts in education can be mutually re-
inforcing. Both are about developing creativity, collaboration, critical thinking, and self-
confidence: attitudes, skills and values that are essential to a life lived in freedom and 
responsibility. Promoting global citizenship is one of the objectives of the Agenda 2030 
(SDG 4.7). The EU should stimulate exchanges of good practice and create a network of 
national experts to encourage cross-border learning.  
 
Culture and governance: effective, transparent and accountable institutions  
(SDG 16) 
In many parts of the world there is deep popular discontent with the lack of effective, 
transparent and accountable government. North Africa and the Middle East are among 
several areas where resentment is on the rise. While Emirati respondents hold positive 
views about the direction of their country, Tunisians, Egyptians and Iraqis are very nega-
tive and do not have confidence in any of their country’s institutions. Jobs, education, and 
political reform are the three top priorities of people across the region. A recent poll found 
that political reform has advanced as an issue of concern in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iran. Ending corruption has climbed the ranks in Tunisia as well as in Egypt 
(to first place). And the protection of civil rights has risen as an issue of importance in 
Jordan and Iraq.145 Worldwide, majorities favour representative democracy over other 
forms of governance.146 
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There is no sustainable development without governance that is perceived as effective 
and fair. Good governance cannot be imposed from the outside. Isomorphic change,  
encouraged by external donors eager for quick wins, usually results in Potemkin-type 
institutions. Democracy promotion is not for the faint-hearted. That said, it is equally 
important to avoid the other extreme of lending uncritical support to oppressive regimes. 
Europeans would do well to remember their embarrassment during the Arab Spring, 
having long supported Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak. Institutional reform is 
part of the SDG agenda and Europe should not shrink from the task. 
 
One of the areas which needs effective, transparent, and accountable institutions is 
culture. There are various ways in which EU governments and the Commission could 
make a difference. They could, first of all, support systems of cultural governance that are 
transparent and open to influence from civil society, regardless of gender, ethnicity, age, 
class, or ability. The EU can also assist partners to integrate culture in national develop-
ment plans that are subject to integral evaluation, reporting, and public scrutiny. National 
statistical offices could be supported in collecting, analysing, and reporting the necessary 
cultural statistics. The EU could support links between local governments in EU member 
states and their counterparts in other parts of the world, including through UNESCO’s 
Creative Cities Network. EU embassies could help raise popular awareness of the SDGs at 
the many EU festivals of films, food, and literature. And, crucially, the EU can help ensure 
that cultural policies and practices across the world are embedded in respect for artistic 
freedom, including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.  
 
By themselves, these steps will not be enough to satisfy public demand for political 
change. Yet even such incremental reforms can help change the tone and the substance of 
public debate. Artists, writers, journalists often rank among national opinion leaders. 
Many face censorship, harassment, or worse. EU support for good cultural governance 
can give them the support they need and deserve. 
 
Culture, peace and security (SDG 16) 
SDG 16 is somewhat of a mixed bag in that its objectives range from promoting peace and 
the rule of law to building better institutions. Among these targets peace is obviously 
essential and must be at the heart of any SDG strategy. Can cultural initiatives help to 
promote peace and security? 
 
Culture is not an innocent possession. Images can be instruments of propaganda. 
Songs can be weapons of war, and music a tool of torture. Radio was used in Rwanda to 
incite genocide. Serb artillery deliberately destroyed the Sarajevo library. Islamist extrem-
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ists turned the World Heritage site of Palmyra to rubble. Members of the Iraqi National 
Symphony Orchestra received death threats for playing classical music.147 Depressing 
examples abound.  
 
But what about culture’s positive potential? Can art and culture assist in post-conflict 
rehabilitation? Can cultural interventions facilitate reconciliation? Does culture have the 
power to transform conflicts, and possibly even prevent them? Unfortunately, these  
questions do not permit ready answers. Post-conflict rehabilitation can take years, and the 
contribution of any one factor, cultural or otherwise, can be difficult to identify. Causality 
across a longer time span is often difficult to prove. Prevention is even harder to establish. 
Not surprisingly, much of the evidence is tentative.  
 
There is one exception: culture’s contribution to trauma recovery is well-established. 
Creative arts and play therapy have helped children to recover from mass violence, in-
cluding in the former Yugoslavia and in the USA after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001.148 Art can be a pathway to empower people to cope with post-traumatic stress, 
and become survivors instead of victims.149  
 
Cultural work with refugees and migrants has been supported by the EU for quite 
some years, including in non-EU countries such as Lebanon and Syria. EU member states 
have also been involved. In 2017 they published a review of what they saw as good na-
tional practices, mostly within Europe.150 Some of this work could be of use to govern-
ments and agencies elsewhere in the world. Most of the world’s 65.6 million forcibly dis-
placed people live outside Europe. If Europe were to invest in international dialogue 
about cultural empowerment it might find it has as much to learn as to share. 
 
Can the arts and culture facilitate reconciliation? Theatre has often been used in post-
conflict situations as a way to bring to bring people together. Longer-term effects (im-
pacts) in terms of reconciliation have mostly proved elusive, like in Sri Lanka. James 
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Thompson offers a sobering perspective.151 Museums, too, can contribute to reconciliation 
by enabling visitors to explore their community’s experience as part of a wider context. 
Northern Ireland’s Mid-Antrim Museum engaged local people in exploring traditions. 
The aim was to allow plural voices and histories to take shape.152 
 
Can cultural initiatives help to prevent violent conflicts? Documentaries by photogra-
phers and film makers can raise awareness of atrocities. Radio can nurture dialogue over 
confrontation. In Mali, Studio Tamani’s programmes are followed by 1.6 million listeners 
every day. An impact study found that the station allows listeners to be well informed, 
and that it gives them a preference for dialogue as a solution to resolve conflicts.153 But 
what evidence exists is mostly anecdotal.  
 
The European Union believes that culture can be an instrument to prevent terrorism. 
According to HRVP Federica Mogherini, “When Europe engages with the world, culture 
has to be at the core of our foreign policy. Culture can help us fight and prevent radicali-
sation.”154 The Joint Communication also states that culture can help to counter violent 
extremism,155 and deepening work on culture to counter violent extremism is part of the 
EU’s official foreign policy strategy.156 Does culture really work to prevent terrorism? The 
evidence base is weak. Labelling the odd youth project or theatre performance as a contri-
bution to counter-radicalisation is not the same as demonstrating impact.  
 
EU governments are on firmer ground in their efforts to prevent the trafficking of  
cultural goods that finance organised crime, money laundering and terrorism. In SDG 16.6 
governments promised to reduce illicit financial flows, strengthen the recovery and return 
of stolen assets and combat organised crime. Illegal trade in archaeological artefacts is big 
business, and Europeans play an active part. Via Facebook antiquities can be stolen on 
request (“loot-to-order”). Sophisticated networks of traders and robbers share information 
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about how and where to dig. The traffickers come mostly from the Middle East, users are 
based in the United States, Germany, France, the UK, Belgium and elsewhere.157 European 
governments must do more to stop this shameful trade. Europol too has work to do.  
 
ISIS’ destruction and looting of World Heritage in Syria and Iraq has thrown the need 
to protect cultural heritage into sharp relief. One major international legal instrument is 
the 1954 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict. All EU member states have joined it, except Malta. Worldwide, only 133 
states have joined and membership is particularly low in Sub-Saharan Africa, South and 
South East Asia, and the Pacific. The other principal treaty is the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property. This has been ratified by 138 states including most EU 
member states. Ireland, Latvia, and Malta are still missing in action. Getting more coun-
tries to ratify and apply these important treaties would be a fitting target of European 
cultural diplomacy. 
 
Europeans can also contribute money and expertise. Several EU governments have 
launched schemes to protect cultural heritage. France set up the International Alliance for 
the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Conflict Areas (with help from the United Arab 
Emirates). Italy partnered with UNESCO to establish the Unite4Heritage Task Force, 
which is to be deployed for the protection of heritage at risk. The UK launched its own 
Cultural Protection Fund. The Dutch Prince Claus Fund (a private foundation) set up a 
Cultural Emergency Response Programme. The European Commission, too, provides 
project finance, and heritage protection was included in the mandate of the EU’s advisory 
mission on security sector reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq). What remains to be achieved is 
synergy. There is obvious scope for a more coordinated approach.  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that there are plenty of opportunities for the EU to drive the 
global agenda on culture in development.  
 
The international order is changing, and many of the changes are reducing the scope 
for rights and liberties. But there are also changes that create opportunities to enlarge that 
scope, and Agenda 2030 is among them.  
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Development is freedom, as Amartya Sen famously wrote, and culture can be a pow-
erful driver and an enabler of development.  
 
The cause of culture in development needs champions. Will the EU be among them?  
 
7. Liberty and populism in Europe 
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7. Liberty and populism in Europe 
In the previous sections we have looked at some key changes in the international order. 
Some, such as the downward trends in democracy and human rights and the spreading of 
disinformation, pose threats to Europe’s core values and interests; other changes, such as 
the world’s new development agenda, offer opportunities to enlarge the scope of freedom. 
 
Along with changes in the world at large there have been important developments 
closer to home, within the European Union. One prominent (and perhaps dominant) 
development has been the rise of intolerance fuelled by populism, and it is to this that we 
now turn.  
 
European voters are adrift. In more and more countries the traditional duopoly of  
centre-right parties and centre-left parties has been broken and the political centre has 
fragmented. The main beneficiaries have been populist parties. Sometimes on the left 
(Spain, Greece), but mostly on the right of the political spectrum. In 20 years populist 
parties more than tripled their vote. The rise of populism has been described as the most 
important European political development of the 21st century.158  
 
Is this correct? As a political force, how strong is populism in Europe today? In Octo-
ber 2017 the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) won 26% of the popular vote. An analysis of 
right-wing populist parties in 22 European countries showed that, on average, these par-
ties won 16 percent of the vote in the most recent parliamentary election in each country, 
up from 11 percent a decade earlier and 5 percent in 1997.159 A strong and impressive 
showing, certainly, but not an electoral tsunami. If one out of four voters vote for a popu-
list party, that still leaves three out of four who don’t. Populism’s bark, it seems, may be 
worse than its bite.  
 
Unfortunately, the problem is real. Two factors make the rise of populism more  
significant than the statistics suggest. Radical right-wing parties entered governments in 
eleven European countries, including Austria and Italy, and several of their core ideas 
have entered the mainstream. Centrist parties responded to the rise of right-wing compet-
itors by moving to the right themselves, from Germany’s CSU to Holland’s VVD (liberals) 
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and CDA (Christian democrats). Discourse reinforcing notions of outsiders and insiders, 
long the hallmark of right-wing populists, is now practiced across the political spectrum.  
 
Populists tend to suggest that society is dominated by immoral, abusive and secretive 
elites. The people must be protected against these elites and they, the populists, are the 
ones to do it. Populists present themselves as the sole true champions of the people. To 
stand in their way is to thwart the will of the people. Political competitors are depicted as 
stooges (or even part) of the elite who fail to serve the interests of the people. In a similar 
vein, populists treat courts that restrain their power as “enemies of the people.” Journal-
ists, academics, or others who speak out against them are tarred with the same brush. 
Populists, as Jan Werner Müller writes, are anti-pluralist as well as anti-elite.160  
 
In this respect, today’s European populists differ from their predecessors. As Cas 
Mudde notes, it is noteworthy that in the early 20th century, nationalism and socialism 
mobilised mainly as anti-democratic extremism, whereas at the beginning of the 21st 
century populists are mainly democratic but anti-liberal.161 Today’s populists accept  
popular sovereignty and majority rule, but reject key features of liberal democracy such as 
minority rights, rule of law and separation of powers. The Swiss People’s Party is a case in 
point. In 2018 the right-wing Schweizerische Volkspartei triggered a national referendum to 
give Swiss law precedence over international law and treaties. The proposal, which aimed 
to “free” Switzerland of human rights obligations, including to refugees, was rejected by 
around two-thirds (67%) of those voting. Still, a sizeable minority of around one in every 
three voters (33%) supported the effort to “reclaim national sovereignty”.162 In Central 
Europe this turn away from liberal values is represented by several governing parties, 
including Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS).  
 
There is every reason to be alarmed at this development. Populists act as if the people 
are of one mind and indivisible, and as if they – and they alone – represent the popular 
will. But, as Habermas said, the people only appears in the plural. Pluralism is at the heart 
of democracy. Populists reject pluralism, and this is what makes them dangerous. On any 
given issue “the people” divide into majorities and minorities, and checks and balances in 
politics are essential to prevent majorities violating the rights and freedoms of minorities. 
Few saw this as clearly as John Stuart Mill: 
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“The will of the people … practically means the will of the most numerous or the most 
active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves ac-
cepted as the majority; the people, consequently may desire to oppress a part of their 
number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of 
power.”163  
 
In a democracy liberty must be protected against the tyranny of the majority. It is 
wrong, therefore, to speak of “illiberal democracy” – Viktor Orban’s proud achievement. 
There is no democracy without liberty, and to suggest otherwise is deeply and cynically 
misleading.  
 
It is unfortunate, therefore, that the European Commission, while insisting that the 
rule of law and democracy are interconnected, has focused its criticism of the Hungarian 
and Polish governments largely on violations of the rule of law. As Müller observes, the 
virtually exclusive emphasis on rule of law in public discourse has, arguably, reinforced 
the sense that Europe only cares about liberty, while the nation-state does democracy.164 It 
is time for the EU to call a spade a spade. The Hungarian and Polish developments are not 
just “illiberal”; they are also undemocratic.  
 
When politicians call journalists “jackals” and “whores”, as leaders of Italy’s Five Star 
Movement did; when they call Muslim refugees “lice”, and Roma “animals” as Zolt Bayer, 
founder of Hungary’s Fidezs party did; when the deputy Speaker of the Italian Senate 
says that a black cabinet minister, Cécile Kyenge, reminds him of an “orang-utan”, it is not 
only liberal principles that are cast aside; democracy itself is at stake. Such verbal violence 
serves to dehumanise. Nobody with the faintest awareness of European history can fail to 
hear the ominous echo of Nazi terminology, honed to humiliate and extirpate Jews.165 
Ominous, too, is the failure of all too many peers and compatriots to sanction such abuse. 
Populism is not the same as racism, but the dividing line is erased all too easily.  
 
Why do European voters support populists? Academic research distinguishes be-
tween economic, cultural, and political explanations. Support is partially rooted in eco-
nomic insecurity and social deprivation. The populist message of “us” (the people) versus 
“them” (the elites) strongly resonates with people who feel left behind and who see them-
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selves as the victims of globalisation. But many populist voters are neither poor nor un-
employed. They appear to be motivated more by social and cultural concerns. There is 
strong evidence that migration and other social changes have produced a cultural back-
lash.166 Opposition to migration was a key factor in the Brexit vote. One influential analy-
sis explains Donald Trump’s election as stemming from a rising sense of status threat 
among white Americans.167 A third contributing factor is political alienation: the sense that 
politicians are out of touch with “people such as me” and that voting in elections is use-
less. Populism appeals to people who feel left behind – victims of uncontrollable economic 
forces, unwanted demographic change, and unaccountable political elites. This is a potent 
mix, and the starting point for any countervailing strategy must be to take each of these 
concerns seriously.  
 
Answers will have to be found predominantly at national level. National circumstanc-
es differ widely. National governments control most of the policy instruments, including 
education, taxation, and housing – the tools necessary to tackle declining social mobility, 
one of the causes of discontent. National answers alone will not suffice, however. Popu-
lism is a European phenomenon. Not only does it manifests itself in almost all EU coun-
tries, but populist leaders work together across borders, and opposition to the EU is one of 
the causes that unites them. Populism in Europe is a multi-headed hydra. For all of these 
reasons the responses must be European as well as national. But the EU’s powers are 
limited. So what can it do? 
 
A comprehensive answer would be beyond the confines of this paper, but an obvious 
starting point for the EU would be to mobilise its economic powers. Many people no 
longer believe that the economy serves their interests. This is not “just” a view held by 
populists. On the contrary: large majorities across Europe feel that the economy is rigged 
in favour of the rich and powerful. This is the majority view from Spain (88%) to Sweden 
(56%) and from Poland (67%) to France (75%), Germany (77%), and the UK (76%).168 It is 
not difficult to see why. Millions have lost their jobs since 2007 because of the financial 
crisis, yet not a single leading Wall Street executive has been prosecuted.169 Banks practice 
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business as usual; they work around the EU cap on bonuses by increasing the fixed pay 
(salaries and benefits) and share packages of their top brass. In the United Kingdom top 
CEOs have seen their annual mean pay rise to £5.7 million. They earn as much in 2 ½ days 
as the average worker makes in a year.170 Business as usual for banks still includes money 
laundering: cases in 2018 alone involved the Cyprus Development bank, Dankse Bank, 
MagNet Bank, Pilatus Bank, ING, Raiffeisen Bank, and Hypo Voralberg Bank. Yet national 
authorities in Europe only investigate on average 10% of suspicious transaction reports, 
and barely 1% (sic) of criminal proceeds are being confiscated.171 The four big European 
accountancy firms still promote tax avoidance by multinationals, as shown in the “Lux-
Leaks” revelations. Worldwide tax losses as a result of profit shifting amount to a stagger-
ing 500 billion USD a year.172  
 
The financial crisis and its aftermath have dealt a hammer-blow to the credibility of 
the free market as a force for good. Little wonder, then, that populists find it easy to tap 
into a well of popular resentment. Unless these concerns are addressed convincingly, not 
only will mainstream parties in member states continue to lose support, but the EU itself 
will see its legitimacy erode.   
 
There is much that the EU could do if national governments would allow it. Europol 
could do more to crack down on money laundering if national agencies would share more 
information. Today, most of its suspicious transaction reports come from two countries 
only: the UK and the Netherlands. The European Banking Authority could be given great-
er powers to coordinate national banking watchdogs, as the Commission has suggested.173 
EU governments could do more to close the gaps in the national and European rules on 
tax fraud and tax evasion, as the Commission has been urging for years. The EU could 
counter tax evasion by tech companies such as Amazon and Apple, as France has pro-
posed, but other governments blocked the initiative for a digital tax. With a fully-fledged 
banking union, citizen’s savings would be secured and taxpayers would not have to pay 
to save banks, but the Eurogroup postponed the necessary decisions.  
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The EU could also do more to fight unemployment. As matters stand, there are still 
around 17 million people unemployed in Europe, including one in three of young persons 
in Italy, Greece, and Spain. There is arguably no more convincing way to address citizens’ 
widespread concerns about economic fairness. Today the EU spends most of its budget on 
agriculture and regional policy. That does not reflect public opinion. When asked what 
the EU should be spending its money on, people’s first priority is for the EU to spend 
more on social affairs and employment.174 Plans for the EU to set up a European Unem-
ployment Insurance Scheme are far advanced.175 Such a fund, which would help reces-
sion-hit countries with high unemployment, would be a concrete, visible way the EU to 
strengthen its bond with citizens. It would put flesh on the bones of Emmanuel Macron’s 
vision of a Europe that protects (“l’Europe qui protège”), and it would answer the populist 
accusation that the EU is a stitch-up between business and political elites. The idea has 
been embraced by the European Commission and by German Finance Minister Olaf 
Scholz. It was discussed by the Eurogroup, but Germany’s CDU/CSU does not support 
it.176  
 
The EU could also play a more effective role in addressing people’s concerns about 
democracy. National leaders could give citizens a meaningful vote in the selection of the 
Commission President (“Spitzenkandidaten”). They could create a genuine common elec-
toral system for the European elections. And they could, if only occasionally, stop blaming 
‘Brussels’ for unpopular measures agreed by national governments, while claiming  
personal credit for European decisions. The EU’s democratic deficit is real. To counter it, 
national leaders will have to show honesty and courage. 
 
The third, cultural dimension of popular discontent is the most difficult for the EU to 
deal with. Some steps have been agreed in response to the widespread unease about  
migration. Although governments failed to endorse the Commission’s sensible proposals 
for a European distribution programme, they did accept to strengthen border protection. 
A more ambitious proposal for a standing corps of 10,000 operational staff with executive 
powers and their own equipment is included in the Commission’s draft budgetary 
framework. But managing migration is not the only issue here. Much more must be done 
to stem the rising, toxic tide of exclusionary nationalism.  
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Across Europe, political entrepreneurs are weaponising identity by stoking prejudice 
against foreigners. A Europe where people are told to fear non-Europeans is a Europe that 
cannot be a constructive and effective force in the world. A Europe where people are told 
to fear their fellow-Europeans – as competitors for housing, schools, jobs, and benefits – is 
a Europe that cannot hold together. The European Union is the world’s only successful 
attempt to solve national differences peacefully through law and common institutions. 
The secret of the EU’s success is the willingness to strike a balance between unity and 
diversity. To live together, Europeans have found they must be willing to take each oth-
er’s interests and views into account, and abide by the common rules that allow them to 
do so. Over decades, the EU has built an unprecedented but fragile sense of trust among 
Europeans. The politics of division are designed to destroy this trust. Populists aim at the 
heart of the European dream.  
 
Trust is easy to diminish but difficult to build. Counter-strategies to strengthen social 
cohesion and a sense of common endeavour will have to be developed and maintained 
over time. This is not work at which political institutions excel; civil society organisations 
and other citizens’ initiatives tend to be more successful. Some cultural institutes, such as 
the British Council and the Goethe-Institut, have gained extensive experience with pro-
jects to support civil society and freedom of speech in challenging environments, and in 
some countries (such as Turkey) they work well together to promote these causes. How-
ever, such cooperation is not yet standard practice, and there remains considerable scope 
for joint or coordinated projects to support civil society in countries such as Hungary and 
Romania.  
 
There is much the EU could do to support such initiatives, notably by strengthening 
its policies and budgets for citizenship, education, and culture. These include well-known 
programmes such as Erasmus, but also lesser known but important programmes such as 
Europe for Citizens, as will be discussed in the next section. In addition, EU missions in 
third countries do not always work well with the national cultural institutes. Some mis-
sions take a passive approach, arguing that culture is not a priority. 
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8. Citizenship and education 
“We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians.” It is tempting to apply this  
famous statement by the 19th century Italian statesman Massimo d’Azeglio to the Europe-
an Union. Could a stronger sense of belonging together, as citizens of the European Un-
ion, be an antidote to populism? 
 
Populists, of course, deny that European citizenship is possible, let alone desirable. 
The only true citizen is a national citizen. Our identity as citizens is singular; composite 
identity is a contradiction in terms, and a dangerous one to boot. Nor are populists the 
only politicians to believe this. In their wake, even mainstream politicians echo this theme. 
As Theresa May said, to much applause at her Conservative Party Conference, “(i)f you 
believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand 
what citizenship means.”  
 
Three questions, then: can European civic identity exist? Should it exist? And will it 
counter populism? In the past 60 years European integration has steadily progressed, but 
people’s identification with the EU as citizens has not kept pace. Just as France or Germa-
ny managed to mould different regional identities into a strong sense of national identity, 
perhaps it is time for the EU to shape its various national identities into an overarching 
sense of European identity.177 But the analogy with national identity should not be pushed 
too far: European identity is not the same as national identity writ large. Whereas national 
identities, as a rule, are seen as mutually exclusive (I am French, therefore I am not Ger-
man), European identity is inclusive, to a degree (I am French; I am also a European).  
 
This sense of layered European identity has, in fact, been growing. Asked (in 2015) 
whether they see themselves as national citizens only, as national and European, as Euro-
pean and national, or as European citizens only, 39% said they saw themselves as national 
citizens only, but 51% said they identified as national and European citizens. A further 6% 
said European and national, and 2% said European only.178 The latest statistics (2018) 
show that in each EU Member State, more than half of respondents feel that they are citi-
zens of the EU. Across the EU as a whole, 71% feel this way, and at a national level pro-
portions range from 89% in Luxembourg to 51% in Bulgaria.179  
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Europeans say that culture is the factor that does most to create a feeling of communi-
ty among them as EU citizens.180 Eight in ten (80%) think cultural heritage is important for 
the European Union. A large majority of respondents (88%) agree Europe's cultural herit-
age should be taught in schools, as it tells us about our history and culture. More than 
three quarters in each EU Member State agree.181 Cultural heritage could be one of the 
building blocks of policies to strengthen the saliency of European citizenship.  
 
Education, and particularly citizenship education, could be another such building 
block. Education helps to develop the skills, attitudes and values people need to live as 
citizens in a democracy. To grasp the importance of education as the foundation of citi-
zenship, we need to look no further than the words of Mr Steve King. King, a nine-time 
US Republican Congressman allied to President Trump, does not understand why terms 
like “white nationalist” or “white supremacist” are offensive.  
 
“White nationalist, white supremacist, Western civilization — how did that language 
become offensive?” King said. “Why did I sit in classes teaching me about the merits of 
our history and our civilization?”182 
 
Whether King was being disingenuous or failed to pay attention in class, he should 
have known the answer. The USA is a melting pot of nations, held together by allegiance 
to common civic values. One of these is respect for other people – a principle central to 
“Western” as well as other civilisations. To engage respectfully in dialogue with others 
(that is, reasoned exchange), is one of the principal lessons we learn through education, 
including civic education. This is why education “is the single greatest key to human 
dignity”, as Jonathan Sacks wrote in his beautiful book on The Dignity of Difference.183 
 
Education and culture are areas where the EU has only limited competence. It may 
support, coordinate, or complement actions of the member states, but EU legislation in 
these areas is not allowed to harmonize national laws or regulations. The EU budget 
spends little on education and culture. For many years education and culture rarely fig-
ured on the agenda of the European Council, but this is changing. In December 2017 the 
European Council declared that education and culture are key to building to inclusive and 
cohesive societies, and to sustaining European competitiveness. They also expressed a 
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willingness “to do more in these areas, in which the EU plays an important supplement-
ing and supporting role.”184 A few weeks earlier, at the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and 
Growth in Gothenburg, the European Pillar of Social Rights had been jointly signed by the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. In its first principle, the European 
Social Pillar states that everyone has the right to quality and inclusive education, training 
and life-long learning in order to maintain and acquire skills that enable them to partici-
pate fully in society and manage successfully transitions in the labour market.  
 
These declarations came in the wake of a spate of terrorist attacks which pitted  
communities against each other. They reflect the hope that education and culture can help 
restore the social fabric. That these statements were adopted at the highest political level 
signals there is, for the first time, growing awareness of and support for the role of the EU 
in the field of education and culture.  
 
But declarations alone do not change reality. Will these statements of principle be act-
ed upon? Much, of course, will depend on the available budget. In its proposal for the 
EU’s multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027 the European Commission has pro-
posed to more than double the funding for Erasmus+, the Union’s flagship programme for 
education, youth, and sport, to 30 billion EUR. Erasmus could then provide learning and 
mobility opportunities to 12 million people, compared to 4 million under the current 
programme. The Commission also proposes to increase the budget for Creative Europe, 
the EU programme for culture and media, to 1.85 billion EUR, including 609 million EUR 
for culture. To put this into perspective: the amount proposed for culture amounts to 
0.05% of the EU budget (MFF, 2021-2027). Out in the real world, among citizens and cul-
tural organisations, there is huge demand for the EU to do more. The available funds only 
permit one in 6 (16.2%) of applications to be funded. This is a budget that sells Europeans 
short.  
 
Erasmus is seen by citizens as one of the three most positive results of European  
integration.185 Erasmus builds experience, broadens horizons, and boosts employability. 
Eastern European students benefit particularly, with their long-term unemployment being 
reduced by 83% when compared no their non-mobile peers. It is also notable that more 
Erasmus-alumni hold management positions five to ten years after graduation than do 
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their non-mobile peers.186 Erasmus contributes to a more cohesive Union: it fosters posi-
tive social/civil behaviour and a sense of feeling “European” (+19% compared to non-
participants).187 The programme literally brings young people together, including in de-
lightfully serendipitous ways.188  
 
Worldwide, student mobility is at an all-time high. In 2015, 4.6 million students stud-
ied abroad, up from 0.8 million in the late 1970s.189 Countries increasingly compete to 
attract these internationally mobile students, and Europe’s competitive position is being 
eroded. Whereas in 2001 Germany and France were the third and fourth most popular 
destination countries (behind the USA and the UK), by 2017 France had dropped to 5th 
place (behind the USA, the UK, China, and Australia), while Germany slipped to 9th place 
(behind the USA, UK, China, Australia, France, Canada, and Russia). Spain no longer 
makes the top 10.190 EU member states will wish to take their own measures, but to bolster 
Europe’s competitiveness it would also make sense to strengthen the Erasmus pro-
gramme. For this to happen the programme would need to be treated as a strategic asset: 
”need to have”, not just ”nice to have”.  
 
Erasmus is one of the EU’s most successful and popular programmes and the Com-
mission has been right to flag it up as a main priority for the coming years. But there is a 
snag. Agreement on the MFF requires unanimity in the Council. This will not be easy to 
achieve, if only because one of the net-contributors, the UK, is set to leave the Union. EU 
finance ministers may be inclined to axe the proposed increase because benefits for each 
EU country are not easy to predict, and other spending is easier to calculate as part of 
their zero-sum ”juste retour” negotiations about the budget. Erasmus promotes the EU as 
a force for good both inside and outside the EU. It would be myopic to cut its proposed 
budget and ministers of education, culture, and foreign affairs would be wise to say so 
loudly, early, and often.  
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In fact, it could be argued that the entire policy area of education and culture is due 
for a re-appraisal. At a time when presumed national identities are increasingly being 
touted – in EU member states as well as in the world at large – it is time for the EU to 
sharpen its profile as a force for individual liberty and social tolerance. The European 
Union is not only about diversity; it is about unity in diversity. Left unattended, or ad-
dressed through appeasement, centrifugal forces will tear societies apart as they have 
done on so many occasions up to this very day. If European history has any principal 
lesson to teach, it is that by accommodating the erosion of fundamental liberties we con-
done their demise.  
 
Erasmus and Creative Europe will not stem the tide by themselves. More is needed. 
Europe’s politicians should be reminded of their promise to create a European Education 
Area – a boring formula that stands for a sensible, even urgent collection of policies. Here 
is how the Commission sees it. The European Education Area stands for  
 
”[…] a Europe in which learning would not be hampered by borders. A continent where 
spending time in another Member State – to study, to learn and to work – has become 
the standard and where, in addition to one's mother tongue, speaking two other lan-
guages has become the norm. A continent in which people have a strong sense of their 
identity as Europeans, of Europe's cultural heritage and its diversity”.191  
 
An eloquent, moving statement (une fois n’est pas coutume) and three feasible objec-
tives, provided national political leaders liberate this policy area from the miserly ambi-
tions of rather too many ministers of education.  
 
What would re-energising education and culture mean in practice? In its contribution 
to the 2017 Leaders’ Meeting in Gothenburg the Commission has presented various  
proposals to strengthen a sense of common European citizenship, complementary to our 
national, regional, and local identities.192 These proposals now await implementation or 
endorsement. Meanwhile the Commission would do well to reach out beyond the sphere 
of officialdom to cultural institutes, NGOs, and foundations. Citizenship cannot – and 
should not – be constructed from the top; it must be shaped and co-developed by citizens 
and civil society organisations, and the Commission should use its convening power to 
get the ball rolling.  
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Three dimensions deserve particular attention: foreign language education, education 
for citizenship, and restoring the humanities at the centre of education.  
 
Languages 
To live and work together Europeans need to understand each other, and that means 
having access to each other’s languages. In 2002 the Barcelona European Council agreed 
that every European citizen should get the opportunity to learn two foreign languages 
from an early age. Europe is still far from reaching this goal. On the positive side, 83.8% of 
primary school children learn at least one foreign language (2014), but that does not say 
much. Teaching time is limited: on average only one to two hours per week. Only about 
half of pupils in general education are offered two languages (51%); the participation rate 
in vocational education is even lower (34.5%), and there are big differences between 
member states.193 In 13 member states, including Germany and Italy, the trend is flat or 
even downward.194 More than 15 years after Barcelona national ministers have still far 
from given foreign language instruction sufficient priority.  
 
It is not that ministers of education ignore the importance of multilingualism. Council 
resolutions of 22 May 2008, 21 November 2008, and 20 May 2014 explicitly state that  
language competences contribute to people’s mobility, employability and personal  
development. They even mention the importance of classical languages such as ancient 
Greek and Latin.195 But words come easy, and action lags behind. Too many ministers 
ignore at home what they signed up to in Brussels. A push from national parliaments, or 
civil society, may be needed.  
 
The EU and national governments also need to step up their efforts to promote  
European languages in the wider world. This is another area where action on the ground 
has failed to match rhetorical commitment. A decade ago the Council agreed to make best 
use of European languages for developing cultural and economic dialogue with the rest of 
the world and enhancing the role of the EU on the international stage.196 Little has  
happened.  
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Nor have ministers, or the EU, shown much interest on the logical and indispensable 
concomitant of this export policy: common and co-ordinated efforts to promote the study 
and learning of non-European languages in Europe. The Commission did in fact pro-
pose197 to promote the teaching and learning of non-EU languages in the EU but ministers 
declined, and only endorsed the recommendation to promote their own languages. Com-
munication is a two-way street. Winning and keeping friends in an increasingly conten-
tious world is difficult enough as it is. Like it or not, Europeans will need to learn the art 
of listening before speaking.   
 
Citizenship 
Democracy ultimately depends on popular support, which rests on a sense of shared 
identity and common responsibility. Democracy needs people who are willing to think, 
speak, and act as democrats – cives, or citizens - of their political community. In Europe 
today many people are disenchanted with politics, and growing numbers of young people 
do not take part in elections. This is a worrisome trend. Disagreement and disaffection are 
integral to political life, and most people will act as spectators or bystanders at least some 
of the time, but there is a degree of disengagement beyond which democracy withers 
away and dies. Democracy needs citizens.  
 
Nobody is born a citizen, except in the narrow, legal sense. Citizenship is a skill ac-
quired through socialisation, education, and practice. Education, in particular, is essential 
to arm students with the habits they need to live as citizens in democracies. These habits, 
as Sarah Stitzlein notes, include collaboration, compromise, deliberation, critique, dissent, 
hope, and living citizenship as shared fate.198 The rising tide of intolerance across Europe 
is testimony that citizenship has been neglected as a priority in education.  
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The Council of Europe, which has done excellent work on the subject, warns that  
 
”[…] (i)n many countries, education for democratic citizenship and human rights educa-
tion are not sufficiently mainstreamed. In some areas of learning, such as vocational 
training, they are often absent. Where they are present, in many cases not enough is 
being done to monitor their impact, meaning that they do not receive sufficient priori-
ty, with resources geared instead towards areas of education that are evaluated and 
ranked.”199  
 
Europeans know little about each other’s history, social reality, and cultural diversity. 
Much of Europe’s history is shared history, but most national history school curricula 
remain focused on national narratives, notwithstanding excellent efforts to change this 
such as the Council of Europe’s Shared Histories project.200 Europeans also know little 
about the European Union, as opinion surveys have shown for many years. The 2017 
Eurobarometer poll shows that 89% of young Europeans want governments to strengthen 
school education about their rights and responsibilities as citizens of the Union.  
 
It is not that EU ministers are unaware of the importance of the subject. Ministers even 
called for a stronger European dimension in national citizenship education.201 The prob-
lem is, just as with language instruction, that national practices do not reflect European 
declarations. When the Dutch government published draft legislation on citizenship edu-
cation in 2018, for example, it did not include any substantive proposals on the European 
dimension of citizenship.202  
 
Today’s generation of Europeans cannot exercise citizenship responsibly without 
knowledge and understanding of the evil perpetrated by previous generations.  
Understanding of the role Europeans have played in the Holocaust is vital to understand 
the European responsibility to counter anti-Semitism and other forms of prejudice.  
This should be self-evident, but sadly it is not. Teachers can be reluctant to teach about the 
Holocaust to avoid being challenged by students, including from immigrant backgrounds, 
who equate today’s Israel with yesterday’s Nazi Germany. On social media the subject is 
mired in bile. But if Europeans cannot muster the courage to face up to their past, they 
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cannot face their future with confidence. Citizen education in Europe must include  
education about the Holocaust.   
 
One way national authorities could reinforce both the national and the European  
dimension of citizenship would be to strengthen the Europe for Citizens Programme. The 
programme has a dual purpose: to raise awareness of the common history and values of 
the EU, and to encourage the democratic and civic participation of citizens.203 With a 
budget of only 188 million EUR for seven years (2014-2020) it is a small programme. A 
bigger budget would allow the EU to do more to preserve and strengthen democracy in 
Europe.  
 
It should also be made easier for schools, cultural organisations, and other citizen 
groups to access the EU funds for citizenship, culture and education. As so often, the EU 
has scattered its subsidies across numerous instruments, each with different rules and 
time-tables. Citizens should not be expected to trawl through Erasmus+, the European 
Structural and Investment Funds, Creative Europe, Europe for Citizens, the Rights, Equal-
ity and Citizenship programme, the European Solidarity Corps and Horizon 2020, not to 
mention the guidance of the European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education. 
How many people have heard of them? A one-stop-shop, a single web portal to access 
these funds, is long overdue.  
 
Humanities 
Literacy and numeracy, the ability to understand and work with numbers, must hold 
pride of place in any system of education, alongside understanding of the fundamentals 
of natural science. But success in the 21st century depends on more than simply learning 
facts. A recent report on science education in Europe points out that students also need to 
acquire key competences, such as the ability to collaborate, listen to the ideas of others, 
think critically, be creative, take initiative, and constructively manage emotions. The  
authors conclude that science education should focus on competences, and that the  
emphasis must shift from STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) to 
STEAM by linking science with the arts and other fields.204 Science and other disciplines 
must be infused with what philosopher Martha Nussbaum calls the spirit of the humani-
ties: “searching critical thought, daring imagination, empathetic understanding of human 
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experiences of many different kinds, and understanding of the complexities of the world 
we live in.”205 
 
To live in freedom and avoid subservience to authorities or peers, human beings must 
have the confidence to think for themselves. Socratic thinking is essential to a free society. 
It is an even more important skill in today’s world, with societies riven by ethnic, reli-
gious, or other social divisions. Socratic thinking involves questioning our own reasoning 
and taking responsibility for it; it also involves exchanging ideas with others in an  
atmosphere of mutual respect for reason.206 This is what the humanities teach us, Nuss-
baum argues, and this is why democracy needs the humanities.   
 
Much important academic research in the humanities and the arts is carried out by  
so-called rare or small disciplines, such as archaeology, anthropology, oriental languages, 
or linguistics, where student numbers are low and post-degree career opportunities lim-
ited. At many universities and research institutes such bodies of precarious knowledge 
are now threatened with extinction, a victim of budgetary cuts.207 Europe is impoverishing 
itself: once lost, such knowledge is difficult and expensive to regain.  
 
For all of these reasons one would expect that the European Union would have put the 
humanities front and centre in its research funding.208 That is not the case. Horizon 2000, 
the EU’s flagship research programme, allocates a mere 7% of its budget to the social 
sciences and humanities – together.209 At national level the situation is not much better. 
Even in a prosperous country like Norway only three per cent of the funding allocated by 
the Research Council goes to humanities research.210 If Europe is serious about the quality 
of its democracy – and its competitiveness – is will have to step up to the plate.  
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Time to return to our three questions. European civic identity does exist. Most Euro-
peans see themselves as citizens of the EU as well as citizens of their national state. That, 
to most liberal democrats, is a welcome development. Like all democracies, the EU needs 
its citizens to think and act as citizens. Will a stronger sense of common endeavour be an 
antidote to populism? Populists seem to think so, and oppose any moves to strengthen 
European cultural cooperation. That might not be the worst reason to promote it.   
9. Revisiting European cultural diplomacy 
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9. Revisiting European cultural diplomacy 
In previous chapters we have seen how the European core values of democracy, the rule 
of law, and human rights are being challenged around the world. At the same time, new 
opportunities to promote freedom and good governance are opening up as a result of 
Agenda 2030, the UN strategy to realise the Sustainable Development Goals. In this final 
section we will look at how these changes affect European diplomacy. Are EU policies to 
defend and promote cultural freedom and related human rights fit for purpose? If not, 
what changes are needed? 
 
In Europe, cultural policy is primarily a national competence. The EU is not in the 
driving seat, but it plays an important supporting role. The EU Treaty aims at an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe. Against that background it confers on the 
Union the task, inter alia, of contributing “to the flowering of cultures of Member States, 
while at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.” Cool language 
that speaks to the hotly contested issue of European identity. Nineteenth century national-
ism saw culture as the emanation of national identity. The Treaty takes a more subtle 
view. It sees both unity and diversity as essential to Europe’s cultural identity. Striking the 
right balance has not been easy.  
 
On the one hand the Union supports and supplements national actions to respect  
cultural and linguistic diversity and to strengthen the competitiveness of the cultural and 
creative sectors, in accordance with Article 167 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and  
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,. The cultural and creative sectors 
include inter alia architecture, archives, libraries and museums, artistic crafts, audio-visual 
(including film, television, video games and multimedia), tangible and intangible cultural 
heritage, design, festivals, music, literature, performing arts, publishing, radio and visual 
arts.3 On the other hand the EU supports efforts to create common perspectives, such as 
the European year of cultural heritage.  
 
Most EU cultural projects take place within Europe, but there is also an international 
dimension. For many years the Commission has paid for cultural projects outside the EU, 
but only in 2007 was culture in external relations identified as one of the main aspects of 
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the Union’s cultural agenda (European Agenda for Culture).211 In 2008 the Council called 
for “a European strategy for incorporating culture consistently and systematically in the 
external relations of the Union and contributing to the complementarity of the Union’s 
activities with those of its Member States”212, and in May 2011 the European Parliament 
asked for a common strategy on culture in the EU’s external relations.213 Parliament also 
voted a budget of 500,000 EUR for a Preparatory Action in this field. In 2015 the Council 
adopted Conclusions on culture in the EU’s external relations that called for “a more 
integrated approach […] that includes the mainstreaming of the cultural dimension in 
development programmes.”214 Finally, In 2016, the Commission and the EEAS issued a 
Joint Communication entitled ”Towards an EU strategy for international cultural rela-
tions.”215 When the Council endorsed the Joint Communication it emphasised that culture 
is “an essential part of the EU’s international relations.”216  
 
There is an ongoing international debate between proponents of “cultural diplomacy”, 
understood as the domain of public authorities, and “cultural relations”, regarded as the 
preserve of politically independent cultural organisations and practitioners. The distinc-
tion is easier to draw in theory than in practice. In reality, governments often work 
through “arms-length” relationships with nominally independent cultural institutes and 
organisations, while these organisations receive much of their funding from the public 
purse. The EU deals with the issue in time-honoured fashion: a fudge. As its convoluted 
title indicates, the “Communication” is not a full-blown “strategy” (cultural diplomacy), 
but something that points the way towards a strategy […] for cultural relations. Honi soit 
qui mal y pense.  
 
The three main objectives of the Joint Communication are (i) to support culture as an 
engine for social and economic development, (ii) promoting intercultural dialogue and the 
role of culture for inter-community relations, and (iii) reinforcing cooperation on cultural 
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heritage. Intercultural dialogue will be promoted through cooperation between cultural 
operators; peace building cultural activities; exchanges between young people, students, 
researchers, scientists and alumni; as well as through cooperation on the protection of 
cultural heritage. The EU sees cultural heritage as an important manifestation of cultural 
diversity that needs to be protected. Rehabilitating and promoting cultural heritage at-
tracts tourism and boosts economic growth. It proposes joint action with partner countries 
to develop sustainable strategies for heritage protection through training, skills develop-
ment and knowledge transfer.  
 
The EU calls for a cross-cutting approach to culture.  
 
“Culture is not just about the arts or literature. It spans a wide range of policies and ac-
tivities, from inter-cultural dialogue to tourism, from education and research to the 
creative industries, from protecting heritage to promoting creative industries and new 
technologies, and from artisanship to development cooperation.”  
 
An EU Cultural Diplomacy Platform has been created to help with the implementa-
tion of the strategy. The EU also concluded an Administrative Arrangement with the 
European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) to improve cooperation in the 
field of culture across the world. EUNIC clusters in 14 partner countries are piloting the 
implementation of the arrangement.  
 
Interestingly, the Communication argues that it is “necessary to go beyond projecting 
the diversity of European cultures, and aim at generating a new spirit of dialogue, mutual 
listening and learning, joint capacity-building and global solidarity.” Three years on, this 
spirit has not quite caught on yet, as most European countries that practice cultural  
diplomacy continue to work firmly within the traditional paradigm of exporting and 
show-casing “national culture”. But there have been signs of change. Even in France, 
where cultural diplomacy remains largely about promoting “le rayonnement français”, 
there is growing interest in listening and learning.   
 
Perhaps the most notable sign of change is the promise by President Emmanuel Mac-
ron to return African heritage in French museums to Africa, permanently or temporarily. 
Two French academics, Felwine Sarr and Bénédicte Savoy, followed up with a detailed 
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study supporting Macron’s pledge.217 The proposal and the report stirred up much con-
troversy, and not a little embarrassment. Many European museum directors were roundly 
critical. As one of them commented: “The issues the French have raised — giving every-
thing back to the countries of origin — have nothing to do with reality nor, as a rule, the 
interests of these countries.”218 Other interested parties reacted more constructively.219 The 
issue, it must be said, deserves more than an ill-tempered dismissal. The moral case for 
restitution is strong, even though the practical consequences should be carefully debated. 
One obvious question is whether objects, once returned, will be properly cared for. Antiq-
uities that have been returned have been known to go missing. In 1993 the  
Metropolitan Museum of Art returned the ”Lydian Hoard”, a 6th century BC collection of 
gold and silver objects, to Turkey. Once back on Turkish soil, key examples of the treasure 
were promptly stolen. Similar cases are reported from Iraq.220  
 
National museum directors will reach their own conclusions. At the same time the  
debate holds a number of lessons for Europe as a whole. To start with, the issue would 
benefit from some European coordination, if only to avoid decisions being taken largely 
along national lines – in an unintended but no less awkward echo of previous colonial 
competition. EU ministers could take the lead and decide to build on the European Year of 
Cultural Heritage (2018). Using the EU budget, ministers could agree to coordinate their 
support for collections and museums in Africa and other parts of the world. A practical 
(and highly symbolic) way to cement their cooperation would be to launch a European 
programme for investment in cultural infrastructure in the Global South, as a concrete 
expression of national and European cultural diplomacy. Such a European initiative 
would help turn the debate, with its current perspective of winners and losers, into a 
positive sum game. Above all, it would energise European-African cultural relations. Why 
not use this opportunity to create genuine partnerships – partnerships between equals – 
and conceive the programme from the start as a joint initiative between Europe and  
Africa?  
 
For too long Europe’s cultural relations with Africa, Asia, and Latin America have 
been stuck in the post-colonial mode of donors and recipients. What is clear is that Eu-
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rope’s counterparts in other parts of the world are not looking to play role of grateful 
recipients of European development aid or cultural show-casing. What they have been 
asking for is to be included in joint projects, collaborative projects, co-creation and  
co-development. They want and expect Europe to change the traditional model of  
donor-recipient relations, and replace it with models of exchange and cooperation  
between equal partners. Too often Europe is felt to be extending aid, whereas what it 
should be offering is recognition and respect.  
 
Europeans have been slow to respond and adapt, although the tide is beginning to 
change. The EU should build on this change. It should stop thinking of cultural policy as 
“development”. Asian and other partners do not ask to be “developed”, they ask to be 
accepted and valued as equals.  
 
The EU should therefore move away from well-intentioned but traditional practices 
such as European Food Days. Not only are such Days more about display than about 
dialogue, but their ”European” nature is largely fictitious, a mere by-product of parallel 
national show-casing. Instead, EU cultural events should be designed as equal partner-
ships with cultural institutes and artists from the host country. Listening, learning and 
sharing should be prime objectives.  
 
The EU also needs to revisit its policy of supporting mostly short-time cultural pro-
jects. Projects that last one or two years rarely bring sustainable results. Multi-annual 
collaboration is essential to build the necessary experience, skills, and trust.  
 
Across the world, technology is driving innovation, including in the creative and  
cultural industries. Cultural organisations in Europe, Asia, and other regions are investing 
in digital skills to innovate and reach new audiences.221 This is where EU programs of  
co-creation and co-development with cultural and creative organisations and entrepre-
neurs in other parts of the world could be particularly valuable. The relationship between 
technology and culture poses many questions, and no country or region has a monopoly 
on the answers. Why not set up collaborative platforms between the EU and its partners? 
 
On the European side, collaboration must be firmly anchored in understanding and 
knowledge of the countries and regions concerned. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
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many Europeans are unfamiliar with the diversity within Asia, to give just one example. 
That tends to irk Europe’s partners, who remain sensitive to signs of post-colonial Euro-
pean indifference. The EU needs to promote and sustain EU-wide networks of area and 
country experts; funding these should be a priority of national and European research 
spending. 
 
The Sustainable Development Goals imply that culture must be an integral part of pol-
icies to alleviate poverty, promote education, gender equality, and sustainable urbanisa-
tion, and build peaceful societies that respect universal human rights. This is the most 
comprehensive agenda for culture the world has ever seen. The EU should publish a 
white paper proposing to work with international partners in leading this agenda. As 
discussed in chapter 6, European priorities should include culture and education, culture 
and governance, and culture and security.  
 
Europe, to sum up, must orient its cultural diplomacy away from dependency and 
towards to collaboration. It is time for the paradigm to change, clearly and unambiguous-
ly. It is time for ministers to take the lead, and for the EU to communicate the change.  
 
Standing up for cultural freedom 
Moving from donorship to partnership is one of two major policy changes that Europe 
needs to realise the potential of cultural diplomacy. The other, equally important step is 
allowing cultural diplomacy to be at the centre of Europe’s response to the erosion of 
liberty around the world. As this paper has argued, this requires much closer synergy 
between Europe’s cultural relations and EU policies to defend and promote human rights. 
Cultural liberty is essential to a life lived in freedom and dignity. Preserving and  
enhancing space for cultural liberty should be the main objective of European cultural 
diplomacy.   
 
There are two dimensions to this, an external one and one that is internal to Europe. The 
first dimension is to weave cultural relations into the fabric of EU external policies, espe-
cially human rights policy and policies to achieve the international Sustainable  
Development Goals, as discussed earlier in this paper. This means that the EU must 
change its approach. Current policy reflects the EU’s traditional approach to foreign aid 
and the logic of its financial instruments. Partnership, and the promotion of cultural free-
dom, are not the principal objectives. On the ground, in countries where artists and other 
groups are looking for Europe to support them in their struggle for freedom, the EU often 
is hemmed in by the rigidity of its financial rules, which benefit large organisations and 
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make it very difficult for the EU to support small scale, innovative grass roots projects. 
The EU must raise its game.  
 
The Communication is no more than a first step. Its conventional philosophy barely 
takes account of the innovative and imaginative work of many European cultural  
organisations. The British Council has invited artists to respond to climate change, the 
Goethe-Institut has explored ways to get (British!) museum-visitors to reflect on the future 
of Europe, many artists have worked to support women’s rights; countless exiting  
experiments focus on digitisation and the arts, in Europe as well as in the wider world. 
Little of this is reflected in the EU’s policy statement. Nor has the EU clarified how the 
‘strategy’ will be financed, or who is in charge of implementation: separate Commission 
DGs, the EEAS, or member states?  
 
Meanwhile many of the EU’s national cultural institutes and ministries remain wed-
ded to their traditional practices of promoting the national language and “national” high 
art. Thus, much potential for European cooperation remains underutilised. Why not in-
vest more in joint projects? For years, the national cultural institutes have been organising 
national “cultural seasons” with countries outside Europe. 2018/2019, for example, the 
Goethe-Institut has been co-organising a year of cultural exchanges with the United States 
(“Wunderbar together”). These “national” years conspicuously lack any European dimen-
sion. One option would be for the Goethe-Institut, the Institut Français, the Instituto Cer-
vantes, and others to include a European dimension in their national programmes, such as 
activities co-organised with a EUNIC member from another country. A more ambitious, 
but equally feasible option would be for national cultural institutes to co-organise com-
mon, European seasons of cultural cooperation with selected third countries. Other possi-
ble joint projects could include adding a European dimension to national visitors pro-
grammes, or setting up European programmes to provide safe havens for artists, journal-
ists, or intellectuals from outside the EU.  
 
The other, parallel change that is needed is to put cultural relations at the heart of  
Europe’s response to the populist attacks on civil liberties, democracy, and the rule of law 
in Europe itself.  
 
We are witnessing growing cultural tensions in Europe – real and perceived. Educa-
tion and culture can be forces of social cohesion, particularly in local communities. Cul-
tural tensions tend to play out directly at local level, and local governments have had to 
adapt. Many city administrations have developed successful models of managing diversi-
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ty, and national policy-makers could build on their experience. Some inspiring examples 
are discussed in a recent study by the Bertelsmann Foundation, which compared the 
diversity strategies of six cities with diverse populations (Mechelen, Leicester, Barcelona, 
Malmö, Toronto, Nashville). The study focused on key areas of civic activity – citizenship, 
education, interaction, the labour market, and the media – as the areas that shape how 
diversity is experienced. Political leadership, it was found, can make a genuine, positive 
difference.222 Here is a practical set of answers to the populist narrative of cultural incom-
patibility between old and new Europeans.  
 
There is much evidence that arts and culture can make communities better places to 
live by helping people to explore their own identity and that of others, and to connect 
through shared experience. Researchers in Canada found that 77% of Canadians agree 
that arts experience makes people feel part of their local community. Canadians who 
regularly attend live music reported a stronger sense of belonging to their city or town. 
Canadians who rate arts, culture and leisure in their community as “excellent” were three 
times more likely to repost a “very strong” sense of belonging.223 
 
Mobilising the power of art and cultural heritage to bring people together is a power-
ful way for public authorities to invest in social cohesion and build or rebuild trust in 
towns and cities. It also is a way to re-create spaces for open dialogue at a time when such 
space is under pressure from various sides. Populists shout down opponents; autocrats 
attack journalists and reduce space for free and open debate; social media use algorithms 
to seduce users into withdrawing in virtual echo chambers and epistemic bubbles; and 
many universities shrink from engaging controversial speakers for fear of causing offence 
(”de-platforming”). Safe spaces for independent thought and free speech are shrinking, 
and counter-measures are overdue. Public authorities must protect, and where necessary 
re-create the civic spaces without which democracy cannot flourish. Open minds need 
open spaces where people can confidently share experiences and ideas. Artists and cul-
tural organisations can be powerful allies in creating and dynamising these spaces, 
whether virtual or physical. Many theatres, museums, and other cultural organisations 
already serve as prominent stewards of civic encounter. 
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This role may not fit all cultural institutions, or at least not yet. Some cultural organi-
sations may need support (infrastructure, money), but some may also have to step outside 
their comfort zone and change their approach. This will take courage. Museums, for  
example, could do more. One leading director believes museums should be more confi-
dent about their voice, and brave in confronting the big issues.224 Museums across Europe 
could draw inspiration from the recent exhibition (”Restless Times”) of German archaeol-
ogy by the Museum für Vor- und Frühgeschichte in Berlin. Rather than presenting exhib-
its in chronological order, the curators display them thematically, to bring out patterns of 
migrations and the age-old connections between Europeans, dissolving the myth of pure, 
national history. At a time when free, independent thinking, respectful dialogue, and 
understanding of European interconnectedness are under sustained attack, such  
Zivilcourage from artists, curators, intellectuals, and politicians is needed more than ever.  
 
National cultural institutes, too, could do more to integrate the European dimension 
into their modus operandi. More than 60 years after EU governments resolved to create an 
“ever closer union” most national cultural institutes still treat European cooperation as an 
optional extra. EUNIC has been obliged to accept European Commission financing (Crea-
tive Europe fund) partly to compensate for the lack of financial support from its member 
organisations. EUNIC clusters currently operate in around 70 countries outside the EU, 
which leaves large parts of Africa and Asia without a EUNIC presence. Arguably, EUNIC 
needs to develop a more strategic approach to its presence in the world. But for EUNIC to 
operate more strategically, its member organisations will first have to develop a more 
strategic view of EUNIC. Is it not time, perhaps, for the Goethe-Institut, the Institut  
Français, the Instituto Camões, the Instituto Cervantes, and others, to include their Euro-
pean vocation under the Treaty in their mandates or mission statements? 
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10. Conclusion 
The attacks on Europe’s core values of liberty, democracy, and the rule of law leave no 
room for complacency. Europe does not lack the means to respond; what it lacks is a sense 
of direction. Cultural diplomacy must be at the centre of Europe’s response to the erosion 
of liberty around the world. Cultural diplomacy’s traditional model, with its dominant 
emphasis on displaying cultural “achievements”, is no longer fit for purpose. It must be 
replaced by a model that not only combines national perspectives with a common, Euro-
pean approach, but which also has cultural freedom among its prime objectives. At the 
same time, national cultural institutes should do more to integrate the European dimen-
sion into their operations. Europe can no longer afford business as usual.   
 
Cultural policy, of course, is not a panacea. In and by itself culture cannot resolve ei-
ther intra-national conflicts or international ones. Soft power is a complement to hard 
power, not an alternative to it, and cultural diplomacy is not a ticket to success in either 
foreign or domestic policy. But culture can be a catalyst, for good and for ill. It can be 
instrumentalised by politicians to foster discord and violence, but it can also be harnessed 
as a force for good – although, paradoxically, not by politicians, at least not directly. For 
culture to be a force to open minds it must be employed, freely, by artists. As Simon 
Brault, the director of the Canada Council of the Arts, has said:  
 
“Artists are not—and must not feel obligated to be—ambassadors in the political sense, 
but they are voices. And although their voices can often be conflicting and critical of our 
reality, artists express concerns that politicians may not even dare to raise, concerns 
that hit home with every human being whom their art speaks to, whether in their own 
country or beyond its borders. This freedom of expression is the guardian of democracy 
and of its renewal.”225 
 
Culture can facilitate independent thinking, dialogue, and understanding. It can  
inspire people to rise above themselves, and to reach out to others. The responsibility of 
politicians is to create the conditions that artists need to work in freedom. No more, no 
less.  
 
There is no quick road to soft power; cultural diplomacy is anything but an easy fix. 
From its political masters it requires both modesty and ambition. Demand too much and 
the policy backfires; do too little and it fails to deliver. Europe will have to steer a course 
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between the Scylla of “weaponising” culture as propaganda and the Charybdis of benign 
neglect.  
 
A second requirement is a sense of realism. Culture’s current popularity among  
governments as a tool to promote the national brand sometimes appears built on shaky 
foundations. Contrary to what the soft power branding indices suggest, there is no direct 
relationship between culture and political power. As Nye has warned, a country’s soft 
power stems from three sources, not one: whether others find our culture attractive, 
whether others think we live up to our values, and whether others regard our foreign 
policies as legitimate. Soft power is not just about culture; it is first and foremost about 
political credibility. As the EU develops its strategy for international cultural relations,  
it would therefore be wise to remember that cultural diplomacy is as much about the 
credibility of its diplomacy as about the attractiveness of its culture.   
 
The EU has made a start. Its “communication” on international cultural relations con-
tains some innovative elements and hold a certain amount of promise. The mere fact of its 
existence is a positive development. At the same time, the EU is still a long way from 
realizing the potential of cultural diplomacy to defend and promote the rights and liber-
ties that are at the core of Europe’s identity, at home and abroad. As this paper has ar-
gued, it is time for the EU to upgrade its policies for international cultural relations and 
integrate them with its other policies to defend and promote Europe’s values and inter-
ests.  
 
The EU should lift its gaze. Its external cultural policies are in need of political owner-
ship and a clear sense of direction. Europe’s politicians could provide the former, and 
cultural organisations the latter. The author’s modest hope is to have contributed to their 
discussion. 
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